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Limits to Arbitrage and Hedging:
Evidence from Commodity Markets
Abstract
Motivated by the literature on limits-to-arbitrage, we build an equilibrium model of commodity
markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging de-
mands for commodity futures. Increases (decreases) in producershedging demand (speculators
risk-capacity) increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures, reduce producers inventory
holdings, and thus spot prices. Consistent with our model, producersdefault risk forecasts futures
returns, spot prices, and inventories in oil and gas market data from 1980-2006, and the component
of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when spec-
ulative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to nancial arbitrage generate limits to hedging
by producers, and a¤ect both asset and goods prices.
1 Introduction
The neoclassical theory of asset pricing (Debreu (1959)) has been confronted by theory and evidence
that highlight the numerous frictions faced by nancial intermediaries in undertaking arbitrage
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), and the consequent price e¤ects of such frictions. These price e¤ects
appear to be amplied in situations in which nancial intermediaries are substantially on one side
of the market (say, for instance, when they bear the prepayment and default risk of households in
mortgage markets, or when they provide catastrophe insurance to households, as in Froot (1999)).
In this paper, we apply the limits to arbitrageview to the analysis of commodity futures markets,
a signicant sector of the economy that has recently experienced signicant asset price movements
as well as a renewed surge of attention from nancial economists. In our theoretical model, com-
modity investment funds speculators are are constrained in their ability to deploy capital in the
commodity futures market, and meet demands for hedging that come from commodity producing
rms. The model, as well as our empirical analysis, reveals that this limit to arbitrage translates
into limits to hedgingexperienced by producers, which in turn impacts real variables such as the
spot commodity price.
More specically, the limit on the risk-taking capacity of speculators implies a price impact of
the hedging demand of risk-averse producers, who are naturally short commodity futures. This price
impact constitutes a cost of hedging, which has consequences for the optimal inventory holding of
commodity producers, and in turn, the commodity spot price. We derive implications of producer
risk aversion and speculator capital constraints for the absolute and relative levels of futures and
spot prices. To understand the comparative statics generated by the model, consider the following
example: assume that producers as a whole need to hedge more by shorting futures contracts,
say, on account of their rising default risk. Given that speculators are limited in their ability to
take positions to satisfy this demand, it depresses futures prices and makes hedging more expensive.
Consequently, producers scale back on holding inventory, releasing it into the market and depressing
spot prices. Therefore, futures risk premia and expected percentage change in the spot price have
a common driver  the hedging demand of producers. Due to this common driver, the model
also predicts that the commodity convenience yield (or basis) should not be strongly related to
commodity futures risk premia. Increases in speculatorscapital constraints have similar e¤ects.
To test the implications of our model, we employ data on spot and futures prices for heating oil,
crude oil, gasoline and natural gas over the period 1980 to 2006. To identify changes in producers
risk aversion and hedging demand, we use movements in the default risk of commodity producing
rms, an identication strategy driven by extant theoretical and empirical work on hedging.1 We
1A large body of theoretical work and empirical evidence on hedging has attributed managerial aversion to risk
as a primary motive for hedging by rms (Amihud and Lev (1981), Tufano (1996), Acharya, Amihud and Litov
(2007), and Gormley and Matsa (2008), among others); and has documented that top managers su¤er signicantly
from ring and job relocation di¢ culties when rms default (Gilson (1989), Baird and Rasmussen (2006) and Ozelge
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employ three di¤erent aggregate measures of the default risk of oil and gas producers in our work:
a balance-sheet based measure the Zmijewski (1984) score; a measure that combines market data
with balance-sheet data the Moodys KMVs expected default frequency; and a pure market-based
measure the lagged three-year stock return of these producers. Our ndings are as follows: First,
commodity producer default risk is positively related to both aggregate and individual producer
hedging demand. The latter is measured using information from the FAS 133 disclosures in annual
and quarterly reports, while the former is measured as the net short positions of market participants
classied as hedgersby the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Second, an increase
in the default risk of producers forecasts an increase in the excess returns on short-term futures of
these commodities. The e¤ect is robust to business-cycle conditions and economically signicant:
a one standard deviation increase in the aggregate commodity sector default risk is on average
associated with a 4% increase in the respective commoditys quarterly futures risk premium.2 Third,
the e¤ect of the default risk of producers on futures risk premia is greater in periods with higher
(conditional) volatility of commodity prices, consistent with such periods being associated with
greater risk of commodity stock outs and a lower risk appetite in the nancial intermediation sector.
Fourth, we nd that the fraction of the futures risk premium attributable to producersdefault
risk is higher in periods in which broker-dealer balance-sheets and the assets under management
of commodity-focused funds are shrinking (these two measures of speculator risk appetite also
predict futures risk premia, consistent with our model). Finally, as producer default risk increases,
our model predicts that producers will hold less inventory, depressing current spot prices. This
prediction is also conrmed in the data  increases in the default risk of oil and gas producers
predict both lower inventory and higher spot returns.
We verify that our results are driven by changes in producer hedging demand in a number of
ways. First, we employ a matchingapproach. In particular, we separate the sample of producers
into those rms that hedge commodity price exposure using derivatives (identied by their FAS
133 disclosures between 1998-2006), versus those that do not hedge. We show that our results are
driven only by measures of aggregate hedging demand derived from the rms that hedge. Second,
we account for the possibility that default risk of commodity producers may be related to business-
cycle conditions that also drive risk premiums. In particular, we employ controls in our forecasting
regressions, in the form of variables commonly employed to predict the equity premium, such as
changes in forecasts of GDP growth, the risk-free rate, the term spread, and the aggregate default
spread, and conrm that our results are una¤ected by the introduction of these controls. Third,
from the set of commodity rms that are included in our Crude Oil measures, we separate out pure
play reners from those that extract (or extract and rene) the commodity. Since reners use crude
(2007)). Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) argue, both theoretically and empirically, that rms hedge more actively when
default risk is higher.
2Futures risk premia are identied through standard forecasting regressions as in, e.g., Fama and French (1987).
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oil as an input, their hedging demand is likely to be in the opposite direction to that of producers
we verify this di¤erential e¤ect in the data. Finally, we employ controls that are commodity
specic, such as the basis, inventory, lagged futures return, and the realized variance of futures
returns in our specications. This is to control for the possibility that producer default risk - an
endogenous variable - may also be related to supply uncertainty, in the form of the likelihood of
inventory stock-outs or other production shocks. Our model predicts that such supply uncertainty
is related to the variance of the commodity price, but that increases in producer risk aversion
should have e¤ects as outlined earlier, even after controlling for this e¤ect. The empirics conrm
that default risk, our proxy for producer risk aversion, continues to explain futures risk premia after
the introduction of these controls, indeed, there is an interactive e¤ect of this predictive power with
realized futures return variance as predicted by the model. To summarize, our model implies that
limits to arbitrage generate limits to hedging for rms in the real economy. Consequently, factors
that capture time-variation in such limits have predictive power for asset prices and a¤ect outcomes
in underlying product markets (spot prices and inventories). Our empirical results are consistent
with the implications of the model and robust to a number of alternative explanations.
The remainder of the introduction relates our paper to the literature. Section 2 introduces
our model. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy. Section 4 establishes the link between the
hedging demand of commodity producers and measures of their default risk at the individual rm
level. Section 5 discusses our main, aggregate empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature. There are two classic views on the behavior of commodity forward and
futures prices. The Theory of Normal Backwardation (Keynes (1930)), states that speculators, who
take the long side of a commodity futures position, require a risk premium for hedging the spot price
exposure of producers (an early version of the limits to arbitrageargument). The risk premium
on long forward positions is thus increasing in the amount of demand pressure from hedgers and
should be related to observed hedger and speculator positions in the commodity forward markets.
Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985), Bessembinder (1992), and de Roon, Nijman,
and Veld (2000) empirically link this hedging pressure to futures excess returns, the basis and
the convenience yield, as evidence in support of this theory.
The Theory of Storage (Kaldor (1939), Working (1949), and Brennan (1958)), on the other
hand, postulates that forward prices are driven by optimal inventory management. In particular,
this theory introduces the notion of a convenience yield to explain why anyone would hold inventory
in periods in which spot prices are expected to decline. Tests of the theory include Fama and
French (1987) and Ng and Pirrong (1994). In more recent work, Routledge, Seppi and Spatt (2000)
introduce a forward market into the optimal inventory management model of Deaton and Laroque
(1992) and show that time-varying convenience yields, consistent with those observed in the data,
can arise even in the presence of risk-neutral agents.3
3There is a large literature on reduced form, no-arbitrage modeling of commodity futures prices (e.g., Brennan
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The two theories are not mutually exclusive. A time-varying risk premium on forwards is
consistent with optimal inventory management if producers are not risk-neutral or face (say) bank-
ruptcy costs; and speculator capital is not unlimited, as in our model. In the data, we nd that
hedgers are net short forwards on average, while speculators are net long, which indicates that
producers do have hedging demands. In support of this view, Haushalter (2000, 2001) surveys
100 oil and gas producers over the 1992 to 1994 period and nds that close to 50 percent of them
hedge, in the amount of approximately a quarter of their production each year. In a recent paper,
Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2007) provide evidence that futures risk premia are related
to inventory levels. Consistent with their ndings, our model also predicts that inventory should
forecast commodity futures returns. In our model, this results is driven by the interaction between
capital-constrained speculators and producer hedging demand, proxied by measures of producer de-
fault risk. Our empirical contribution is to identify that this default risk measure helps to explain
commodity spot prices, risk premia, CFTC hedging pressure measures and inventory levels.
In closely related work, Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 1990) considers the interaction between hedgers
and arbitrageurs. In particular, Hirshleifer (1990) observes that in equilibrium there must be
a friction to investing in commodity futures in order for hedging demand to a¤ect prices and
quantities. In our model, this friction arises due to limited movement of capital, motivated by the
limits to arbitrageliterature, and hedging demand of producers, motivated by a principal-agent
problem as the commodity rm is ultimately owned by the consumers. Furthermore, our analysis,
unlike Hirshleifers, is also empirical. As a useful consequence, in addition to providing evidence
for our model, we are able to conrm many of the propositions of Hirshleifers (1988, 1989, 1990)
theoretical models, using a di¤erent approach than that in Bessembinder (1992). Another related
paper is by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), who show that hedging demand a¤ects spot and
futures prices in electricity markets when producers are risk averse. They highlight that the absence
of storage is what allows for predictable intertemporal variation in equilibrium prices. We show in
this paper that the price impact can arise even in the presence of storage in the oil and gas markets.
Finally, it has proven di¢ cult to explain the unconditional risk premiums on commodity fu-
tures using traditional asset pricing theory (see Jagannathan, (1985) for an earlier e¤ort). Although
conditional risk premiums on commodity futures do appear to be reliably non-zero (see Bessem-
binder (1992)), Bessembinder and Chan (1992) document that the forecastability of price changes
in commodity futures is based on di¤erent asset pricing factors as compared to equity markets.
Furthermore, in a recent paper, Tang and Xiong (2009) show that the correlation between com-
modity and equity markets increases in the amount of speculator capital owing to commodity
markets. These results are consistent with our assumption of time-varying market segmentation
between equity and commodity markets.
(1991), Schwartz (1997), Cassasus and Collin-Dufresne (2005)). General equilibrium models of commodity pricing
include Cassasus, Collin-Dufresne, and Routledge (2009), and Johnson (2009).
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2 The Model
We present a two-period model of commodity spot and futures price determination that includes
optimal inventory management, as in Deaton and Laroque (1992), and hedging demand, similar
to the models of Anderson and Danthine (1980, 1983) and Hirshleifer (1988, 1990). There are
three types of agents in the model: (1) consumers, whose demand for the spot commodity along
with the equilibrium supply determine the commodity spot price; (2) commodity producers, who
manage prots by optimally managing their inventory and by hedging with commodity futures;
and (3) speculators, whose demand for commodity futures, along with the futures hedging demand
of producers, determine the commodity futures price.4
2.1 Consumption, Production and the Spot Price
Let commodity consumersinverse demand function be given by:
St = !

At
Qt
1="
; (1)
where St is the commodity spot price, Qt is the equilibrium commodity supply, At is the consump-
tion of other goods, and ! and " are positive constants. This inverse demand function obtains if the
representative agent has CES utility over the two goods (A and Q) with an intratemporal elasticity
of substitution equal to ". In the Appendix, we argue that the main predictions of our model
presented here are robust to a general equilibrium setting where this inverse demand function is
derived endogenously. In the partial equilibrium setting considered here, however, At represents
an exogenous demand shock, which we assume is lognormally distributed with E [lnAt] =  and
V ar [lnAt] = 
2. This shock captures changes in demand arising from sources such as technological
changes in the production of substitutes and complements for the commodity, weather conditions,
or other shocks that are not explicitly accounted for in the model.
Let aggregate inventory and production be denoted It and Gt, respectively. Further, let  be
the cost of storage; that is, individual producers can store i units of the commodity at t 1 yielding
(1  ) i units at t, where  2 (0; 1) : The commodity spot price is determined by market clearing,
which demands that incoming aggregate inventory and current production, Gt+(1  ) It 1, equals
current consumption and outgoing inventory, Qt + It.
4We model consumers of the commodity as operating only in the spot market. This is an abstraction, which
does not correspond exactly with the evidence - for instance airlines have been known periodically to hedge their
exposure to the price of jet fuel (by taking long positions in the futures market). In the empirical section, we show
that our results are not a¤ected by controlling for a measure of consumershedging demand. Furthermore the CFTC
data on hedger positions indicates that speculative capital (e.g., in hedge funds) has historically been allocated to
long positions in commodity futures, indicating that the sign of net hedger demand for futures is consistent with our
assumption.
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2.2 Producers
There are an innite number of commodity producing rms in the model, with mass normalized
to one. Each individual manager acts competitively as a price taker. The timing of managers
decisions in the model are as follows: In period 0, the rm stores an amount i as inventory from
its current supply, g0, and so period 0 prots are simply S0 (g0   i). In period 0, the rm also
goes short a number hp of futures contracts, to be delivered in period 1. In period 1, the rm sells
its current inventory and production supply, honors its futures contracts and realizes a prot of
S1 (i (1  ) + g1) + hp (F   S1), where F is the futures price and g1 is supply in period 1.5
We assume that managers of commodity producing rms are risk averse they maximize the
value of the rm subject to a penalty for the variance of next periods earnings. This variance
penalty generates hedging demand, and is a frequent assumption when modeling commodity pro-
ducer behavior (for one recent example see Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002)).6 Writing  for
the marginal rate of substitution (pricing kernel) of equity holders in the economy,7 and r for the
risk-free rate, the managersobjective function is:
max
fi;hpg
S0 (g0   i) + E [ fS1 ((1  ) i+ g1) + hp (F   S1)g] :::
  p
2
V ar [S1 ((1  ) i+ g1) + hp (F   S1)] ;
subject to:
i  0: (2)
The rst order condition with respect to inventory holding i yields:
i (1  ) = (1  )E [S1]  S0 + 
(1  ) p2S
  g1 + hp; (3)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the inventory constraint and 2S is the variance of the period 1
spot price. As can be seen from Equation (3), managers use inventories to smooth demand shock. If,
however, the current demand shock is su¢ ciently high, an inventory stock-out occurs (i.e.,  > 0),
and current spot prices can rise above expected future spot prices. In such a circumstance, rms
5Note that the production schedule, g0 and g1, is assumed to be pre-determined. The implicit assumption, which
creates a role for inventory management, is that it is prohibitively costly to change production in the short-run.
6The literature on corporate hedging provides several justications for this modeling choice. Hedging demand
could result from managers being underdiversied, as in Amihud and Lev (1981) and Stulz (1984), or better informed
about the risks faced by the rm (Breeden and Viswanathan (1990), and DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1995)). Managers
could also be averse to variance on account of private costs su¤ered upon distress, as documented by Gilson (1989) for
example, or the rm may face deadweight costs of nancial distress, as argued by Smith and Stulz (1985). Aversion
to earnings volatility can also be generated from costs of external nancing as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
7The setup implicitly assumes that the equity-holders cannot write a complete contract with the managers, on
account of (for instance) incentive reasons as in Holmstrom (1979).
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wish to have negative inventory, but cannot. Thus, a convenience yield for holding the spot arises,
as those who hold the spot in the event of a stock-out get to sell at a temporarily high price. This
is the Theory of Storage aspect of our model.8 Importantly, inventory is increasing in the amount
hedged in the futures market, hp. That is, hedging allows the producer to hold more inventory as it
reduces the amount of earnings variance that the producer would otherwise be exposed to. Thus,
the futures market provides an important venue for risk sharing.
The rst order condition for the number hp of futures contracts that the producer goes short is:
hp = i
 (1  ) + g1   E [ (S1   F )]
p2S
; (4)
Note that if the futures price F is such that E [ (S1   F )] = 0, there are no gains or costs to equity
holders of the managers hedging activity in terms of expected, risk adjusted prots. The producer
will therefore simply minimize the variance of period 1 prots by hedging fully. In this case, the
managers optimal hedging strategy is independent of the degree of managerial risk aversion. This
is a familiar result that arises by no-arbitrage in frictionless complete markets.
If, however, the futures price is lower than what is considered fair from the equity-holders
perspective (i.e., E [ (S1   F )] > 0), it is optimal for the producer to increase the expected prots
by entering a long speculative futures position after having fully hedged the period 1 supply. In
other words, in this situation, the hedge is costly due to perceived mispricing in the commodity
market, and it is no longer optimal to hedge the period 1 price exposure fully. This entails shorting
fewer futures contracts. Note that an increase in the managers risk aversion p decreases this
implicit speculative futures position, all else equal.
The Basis. The futures basis is dened as:
basis  S0   F
S0
= y   r + 
1   ; (5)
where y is the convenience yield. Combining the rst order conditions of the rm (Equations (3)
and (4)), the convenience yield is given by:
y =

S0
1 + r
1   : (6)
The convenience yield can only di¤er from zero if the shadow price of the inventory constraint ()
is positive. In this case, the expected future spot price is low relative to the current spot price, and
this results in the futures price also being low relative to the current spot price.
8 In a multi-period setting, a convenience yield of holding the spot arises in these models even if there is no actual
stock-out, but as long as there is a positive probability of a stock-out (see Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000)).
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The basis is not a good measure of the futures risk premium when inventories are positive.
Producers in the model can obtain exposure to future commodity prices in one of two ways either
by going long a futures contract, or by holding inventory. In equilibrium, the marginal payo¤ from
these strategies must coincide. Thus, producers managing inventory enforce a common component
in the payo¤ to holding the spot and holding the futures, with o¤setting impacts on the basis. This
prediction of the model is borne out in our empirical results, and is consistent with the ndings of
Fama and French (1987).
2.3 Speculators
Speculators take the long positions that o¤set producersnaturally short positions, and allow the
market to clear. We assume that these speculators are specialized investment management com-
panies, with superior investment ability in the commodity futures market (e.g., commodity hedge
funds and investment bank commodity trading desks). As a consequence of this superior invest-
ment technology, investors in other nancial assets (the equity-holders) only invest in commodity
markets by delegating their investments to these specialized funds. As in Berk and Green (2004),
the managers of these funds extract all the surplus of this activity and the outside investors only get
their fair risk compensation. The payo¤ to the fund manager per long futures contract is therefore
E [ (S1   F )], making the net present value for equity-holders of investing in a commodity fund
zero, as dictated by no-arbitrage.
The commodity fund managers are assumed to be risk-neutral, but they are subject to capital
constraints. These constraints could arise from costs of leverage such as margin requirements, as
well as from value-at-risk (VaR) limits. We model these capital constraints as proportional to the
variance of the funds position, in the spirit of a VaR constraint, as in Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand
(2008).9 Commodity funds are assumed to behave competitively, and we assume the existence of a
representative fund with objective function:
max
hs
hsE [ (S1   F )]  s
2
V ar [hs (S1   F )] (7)
+
hs =
E [ (S1   F )]
s2S
; (8)
where s is the severity of the capital constraint, and hs is the aggregate number of long speculator
9Such a constraint is also assumed by Etula (2009) who nds empirical evidence to support the role of speculator
capital constraints in commodity futures pricing. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show in an equilibrium setting that
arbitrageurs, facing constraints akin to the one we assume in this paper, will exploit but not fully correct relative
mispricing between the same asset traded in otherwise segmented markets. Motivating such constraints on speculators,
He and Xiong (2008) show that narrow investment mandates and capital immobility are natural outcomes of an
optimal contract in the presence of unobservable e¤ort on the part of the investment manager.
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futures positions. If commodity funds were not subject to any constraints (i.e., s = 0), the market
clearing futures price would be the same as that which would prevail if markets were frictionless;
i.e., such that E[[(S1   F )] = 0. In this case, the producers would simply hedge fully, as discussed
previously, and the futures risk premium would be independent of the level of managerial risk
aversion. With s; p > 0, however, the equilibrium futures price will in general not satisfy the
usual relation, E [ (S1   F )] = 0, as the risk-adjustment implicit in the speculators objective
function is di¤erent from that of the equity-holders.
2.4 Equilibrium
The futures contracts are in zero net supply and therefore hs = hp, in equilibrium. From equations
(4) and (8) we obtain:
E [ (S1   F )] = sp
s + p
2SQ1; (9)
where the variance of the spot price is 2S  !2Q 2="1

e(=")
2   1

e2="+(=")
2
, and where period 1
supply is Q1 = I (1  ) + g1. From the expression for the basis, (S0   ) 1+r1  = F . We have that:
E [S1 (I
)]  (S0 (I)   (I)) = (1  ) = sp
s + p
kQ1 (I
)1 2=" ; (10)
where k  !2

e(=")
2   1

e2="+(=")
2
. Equation (10) implicitly gives the solution for I. Since
F = (S0 (I
)   (I)) 1+r1  , the equilibrium supply of short futures contracts can be found using
equation (4).
2.5 Model Predictions
Equation (9) can be rewritten in terms of the futures risk premium. In particular, dening f =
S=F as the standard deviation of the futures return, S1 FF , we have that:
E

S1   F
F

=   (1 + r)Corr (; S1)Std ()f + ps
p + s
(1 + r)2fFQ1: (11)
The rst term on the right hand side is the usual risk adjustment term due to covariance with the
equity-holderspricing kernel. However, the the producers and the speculators are the marginal
investors in this market, rather than the equity-holders. The second term, which arises due to the
combination of limits to arbitrage and producer hedging demand, has four components: FQ1, the
forward dollar value of the hedging demand, 2f , the variance of the futures return, p, producers
risk aversion, and s, speculator risk aversion. Note that Equation (11) holds for any consumer
9
preferences (inverse demand functions).10
Comparative Statics. We are interested in comparative statics with respect to producers
propensity to hedge, p (which we refer to henceforth as producersfundamental hedging demand),
and the degree of the capital constraint on speculators, s. The proof of the following Proposition
is relegated to the Appendix, and we only give the economic intuition for the results in this section.
Proposition 1 The futures risk premium and the expected spot price return are increasing in
producers fundamental hedging demand, p:
d
dp
E [S1   F ]
F
> 0 and
d
dp
E [S1   S0]
S0
> 0; (12)
where the latter only holds if there is not a stock-out. In the case of a stock-out, ddp
E[S1 S0]
S0
= 0.
The futures risk premium and the expected spot price return are increasing in the severity of
speculatorscapital constraints, s:
d
ds
E [S1   F ]
F
> 0 and
d
ds
E [S1   S0]
S0
> 0; (13)
where the latter only holds if there is not a stock-out. In the case of a stock-out, dds
E[S1 S0]
S0
= 0.
The optimal inventory is decreasing in both producer and speculator hedging demand, unless
there is a stock-out.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When producersfundamental hedging demand (p)
increases, the managers sensitivity to the risk of holding unhedged inventory increases. In response
to this, the manager reduces inventory and increases the proportion of future supply that is hedged.
The former means that more of the commodity is sold on the spot market, which depresses current
spot prices and raises future spot prices. The latter leads to a higher variance-adjusted demand
for short futures contracts, which is accommodated by increasing the futures risk premium. An
increase in speculator capital constraints, s, has similar e¤ect. The cost of hedging now increases
as the speculators require a higher compensation per unit of risk. The direct e¤ect of this is to
decrease the number of short futures positions. However, this leaves the producer more exposed to
10Since producer hedging demand and limits to arbitrage both a¤ect the optimal supply (inventory) of the com-
modity, the volatility of futures returns is also a¤ected, meaning that the frictions assumed in the commodity market
also show up in the standard risk adjustment (the covariance term). Thus, there is a component of the futures risk
premium that originates from limits to arbitrage and hedging demand that cannot be separately observed from the
standard risk adjustment. Symmetrically, if the volatility and mean of the demand shocks change, this is reected
in the volatility of the futures return which also shows up in the futures risk premium term due to hedging demand
and limits to arbitrage. In the Appendix, we further discuss the interaction between the frictions proposed here and
the standard risk adjustment in the context of a general equilibrium model where the pricing kernel and the inverse
demand function are derived endogenously.
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period 1 spot price risk, and to mitigate this e¤ect, optimal inventory also decreases. In a stock-out,
the inventory is constant (at zero) and consequently so are the expected spot price and its variance.
In that case, the only e¤ect of an increase in producer (or speculator) risk aversion is the direct
e¤ect on the futures risk premium, as the marginal cost of hedging increases.
To evaluate the likely magnitudes of the e¤ect of the models frictions and to illustrate the
model results, we calibrate the model using key moments of the data: in particular, the volatility
of the commodity futures returns, commodity expenditure relative to aggregate endowment (GDP)
and aggregate endowment growth, as well as the mean and volatility of the equity market pricing
kernel. The details of the calibration are given in the Appendix.
The severity of the models frictions are increasing in the variance aversion of producers and
speculators, p and s. The variation in these quantities is shown in the two top graphs of Figure
1 as the producers cost of hedging and the Sharpe ratio earned by speculators, where p is on
the horizontal axis and s is shown as a dashed line for high speculator risk aversion and a solid
line for low speculator risk aversion. The remainder of the plots in Figure 1 shows that the spot
and futures risk premiums are indeed increasing in producer and speculator risk aversion, while
inventory is decreasing. The calibration implies economically signicant variation in both spot
and futures risk premiums. In particular, for high speculator risk aversion (corresponding to their
earning a quarterly Sharpe ratio of about 0:25) and high hedging demand (corresponding to a loss
of about 0:8% of rm value due to hedging), the abnormal quarterly futures risk premium is about
6%, whereas for low producer hedging demand and speculator risk aversion (Sharpe ratio of about
0:05 and loss from hedging of about 0:1% of rm value), the abnormal futures risk premium is less
than 1%. At the same time, the impact on inventory is about a 1% to 9% change in the level. The
e¤ect on expected percentage spot price changes is about the same as for the futures, since the cost
of carry relation holds when there is no stock-out. In sum, reasonable levels of the costs of hedging
and required risk compensation leads to economically signicant abnormal returns in the futures
market, and concomitant changes in inventory and spot prices.
Figure 1 also illustrates an intuitive interaction between speculator risk tolerance and producer
hedging demand. In particular, the response of the abnormal futures risk premium to changes in
producer hedging demand is smaller when speculator risk tolerance is high. These are times when
speculators are willing to meet the hedging demand of producers with small price concessions. If,
conversely, speculators are more risk averse, the price concession required to meet an additional
unit of hedging demand is high.
3 Empirical Strategy
In our empirical analysis we test the main predictions of the model, as laid out in Proposition 1.
To do so, we need proxies for p and s - the fundamental hedging demand and risk appetite of
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producers and speculators, respectively. Clearly, from Equation (11), to identify time-variation in
the futures risk premium from hedging pressure and limits to speculative capital, we must control for
the covariance of the futures return with the equity pricing kernel. We therefore apply a substantial
set of controls and robustness checks in the empirical analysis in order to establish that our ndings
arise on account of producer hedging demand and limited arbitrage capital.
3.1 Commodity Producer Sample
To construct proxies for fundamental producer hedging demand, we employ data on commodity
producing rmsaccounting and stock returns from the CRSP-Compustat database. The use of
Compustat data limits the study to the oil and gas markets as these are the only commodity
markets where there is a large enough set of producer rms to create a reliable time-series of
aggregate commodity sector producer hedging demand. Our empirical analysis thus focuses on
four commodities: crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and natural gas. The full sample of producers
includes all rms with SIC codes 1310 and 1311 (Petroleum Reners) and 2910 and 2911 (Crude
Petroleum and Gas Extraction).11 The total sample of producers consists of 525 rms with quarterly
data going back to 1974 for some rms. We also use data on rmsexplicitly disclosed hedging
activities from accounting statements available in the EDGAR database from 1998 to 2006.
3.2 Proxying for Fundamental Hedging Demand
The amount of production we hedge is driven by the amount of debt on our consolidated
balance sheet and the level of capital commitments we have in place.
- St. Mary Land & Exploration Co. in their 10-K ling for 2006.
In the model, we refer to the variance aversion of the producers, p, as producersfundamental
hedging demand. In the empirical analysis, we propose that variation in the aggregate level of p
can be proxied for, using measures of aggregate default risk for the producers of the commodity.
There are both empirical and theoretical motivations for this choice, which we discuss below. In
addition, we show in the following section that the available micro-evidence of individual producer
hedging behavior in our sample supports this assumption.
The driver of hedging demand that we focus on is managerial aversion to distress and default.
In particular, we postulate that managers act in an increasingly risk averse manner as the likelihood
of distress and default increases. Amihud and Lev (1981) and Stulz (1984) propose general aversion
of managers to variance of cash ows as a driver of hedging demand, the rationale being that while
11These SIC classications, however, are rather coarse: rms designated as Petroleum Reners (e.g., Exxon)
often also engage in extraction, and vice versa. In our robustness checks below, we separate out pure play reners
(as identied from their annual statements) from rms that engage in production, and separately evaluate the e¤ects
of default risk measures from each of these groups.
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shareholders can diversify across rms in capital markets, managers are signicantly exposed to their
rmscash-ow risk due to incentive compensation as well as investments in rm-specic human
capital. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that managerial turnover is indeed higher in rms
with higher leverage and deteriorating performance: e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner
et al. (1988) and Weisbach (1988) provide evidence that top management turnover is predicted
by declining stock market performance. Gilson (1989) renes this evidence, and examines the role
of defaults and leverage. He rst nds that management turnover is more likely following poor
stock-market performance, and that rms that are highly leveraged or in default on their debt
experience higher top management turnover than their counterparts. Gilson further documents
that following their resignation from rms in default, managers are not subsequently employed
by another exchange-listed rm for at least three years - consistent with managers experiencing
large personal costs when their rms default. Finally, Haushalter (2000, 2001) in a survey of one
hundred oil and gas rms over the 1992 to 1994 period, uncovers that their propensity to hedge is
highly correlated with their nancing policies as well as their level of assets in place. In particular,
he nds that the oil and gas producers in his sample that use more debt nancing also hedge a
greater fraction of their production, and he interprets this result as evidence that companies hedge
to reduce the likelihood of nancial distress.
Given this theoretical and empirical motivation, we employ both balance-sheet and market-
based measures of default risk as our empirical proxies for the cost of external nance. The balance-
sheet based measure we employ is the Zmijewski (1984) score. This measure is positively related
to default risk and is a variant of Altmans (1968) Z-score, and the methodology employed to
calculate the Zmijewski-score was developed by identifying the rm-level balance-sheet variables
that help to discriminatewhether a rm is likely to default or not. The market-based measures we
employ are rst (following Gilson (1989)), the rolling three-year average stock return of commodity
producers, and second, the naive expected default frequency (or naive EDF) computed by Bharath
and Shumway (2008).
Each rms Zmijewski-score is calculated as:
Zmijewski-score =   4:3  4:5 NetIncome=TotalAssets+ 5:7  TotalDebt=TotalAssets
  0:004  CurrentAssets=CurrentLiabilities: (14)
Each rms rolling three-year average stock return, writing Rit for the cum-dividend stock return
for a rm i calculated at the end of month t, is calculated as:
ThreeY earAvgi;t =
1
36
35X
k=0
ln(1 +Ri;t k) (15)
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Finally, we obtain each rms naive EDF. The EDF from the KMV-Merton model is computed
using the formula:
EDF = 

 

ln(V=F ) + (  0:52V )T
V
p
T

(16)
where V is the total market value of the rm, F is the face value of the rms debt, V is the
volatility of the rms value,  is an estimate of the expected annual return of the rms assets,
and T is the time period (in this case, one year). Bharath and Shumway (2008) compute a naive
estimate of the EDF, employing certain assumptions about the variable used as inputs into the
formula above. We use their estimates in our empirical analysis.12 Of the set of 525 rms, we
have naive EDF estimates for 435 rms.
In the next section, we rst conrm Haushalters (2000, 2001) results in our sample of rms 
i.e., that our default risk measures are indeed related to individual producer rmshedging activity.
We then aggregate these rm-specic measures within each commodity sector to obtain aggregate
measures of fundamental producer hedging demand, which are used to test the pricing implications
of the model. To arrive at these aggregate measures of producers hedging demand, we construct an
equal-weighted Zmijewski-score, 3-year lagged stock returns, and Naive EDF from the producers
in each commodity sector. While our sample of rms goes back until 1974, the number of rms in
any given quarter varies with data availability at each point in time. There are, however, always
more than 10 rms underlying the aggregate hedging measure in any given quarter. Figures 2a
and 2b show the resulting time-series of aggregate Zmijewski-score, 3-year lagged return, and Naive
EDF for the Crude Oil, Heating Oil, and Gasoline sectors, as well as for the Natural Gas sector.
For ease of comparison, the series have been normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. All
the measures are persistent and stationary (the latter is conrmed in unreported unit root tests
for all the measures). As expected, the aggregate Zmijewski-scores and Naive EDFs are positively
correlated, while the aggregate 3-year producer lagged stock return measure is negatively correlated
with these measures. Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation and quarterly autocorrelation of
the aggregate hedging measures. The reason that these summary statistics are di¤erent for Crude
Oil, Heating Oil, and Gasoline is that the futures returns data are of di¤erent sample sizes across
the commodities.
4 ProducersHedging Behavior
While the main tests in the paper concern the relationship between spot and futures commodity
prices and the commodity sectors aggregate fundamental hedging demand, we rst investigate the
available micro evidence of producer hedging behavior. Haushalter (2000, 2001) provides useful
evidence of the cross-sectional determinants of hedging behavior among oil and gas rms, but his
12We thank Sreedhar Bharath and Tyler Shumway for providing us with these estimates.
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evidence pertains to a smaller sample than ours, over the period from 1992 to 1994.13 A natural
question for our purposes is to what extent the oil and natural gas producing rms in our sample
actually do engage in hedging activity, and if so, in which derivative instruments and using what
strategies. In this section, we use the publicly available data from rm accounting statements in the
EDGAR database to ascertain the extent and nature of individual commodity producer hedging
behavior.
4.1 Summary of Producer Hedging Behavior
The EDGAR database has available quarterly or annual statements for 231 of the 525 rms in the
sample. In part, the smaller EDGAR sample is due to the fact that derivative positions are only
reported in accounting statements, in our sample, from 1998 onwards.14 We determine whether
or not each rm uses derivatives for hedging commodity price exposure by reading at least two
quarterly or annual reports per rm. Panel A in Table 1 shows that out of the 231 rms, there are
172 that explicitly state that they use commodity derivatives, 20 that explicitly state that they do
not use commodity derivatives, and 39 that dont mention any use of derivatives. Of the 172 rms
that use commodity derivatives, Panel B shows that 146 explicitly state that they use derivatives
only for hedging purposes, while 16 rms say they both hedge and speculate. For the remaining
10 rms, we cannot tell. In sum, 74% of the producers in the EDGAR sample state that they use
commodity derivatives, while a maximum of 26% of the rms do not use commodity derivatives.
Of the rms that use derivatives, 85% are, by their own admission, pure hedgers.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the instruments the rms use and their relative proportions. Forwards
and futures are used in 29% of the rms, while swaps are used by 52% of the rms. Options
and strategies, such as put and call spreads and collars, are used by 20% and 33% of the rms,
respectively. Most options positions are not strong volatility bets. In particular, low-cost collars
that are long out-of-the-money put and short out-of-the-money calls are the most common option
strategy for producers a position that is very similar to a short futures position. Thus, derivative
hedging strategies that are linear, or close to linear, in the underlying are by far the most common.
We focus on short-term commodity futures - the most liquid derivative instruments in the
commodity markets - in our empirical analysis. However, a considerable fraction of the hedging
13Another notable study of rm-level hedging behavior in commodities is Tufano (1996), who relies on proprietary
data from gold mining rms.
14Since the introduction of Financial Accounting Standards Boards 133 regulation (Accounting for Derivative
Instruments and Hedging Activities), e¤ective for scal years beginning after June 15, 2000, rms are required
to measure all nancial assets and liabilities on company balance sheets at fair value. In particular, hedging and
derivative activities are usually disclosed in two places. Risk exposures and the accounting policy relating to the use of
derivatives are included in Market Risk Information.Any unusual impact on earnings resulting from accounting for
derivatives should be explained in the Results of Operations.Additionally, a further discussion of risk management
activity is provided in a footnote disclosure titled Risk Management Activities & Derivative Financial Instruments.
Some rms, however, provided some information on derivative positions also before this date.
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is done with swaps, which are provided by banks over-the-counter, and often are longer term. On
the one hand, this indicates that a signicant proportion of producers hedging is done outside
the futures markets that we consider. On the other hand, banks in turn hedge their aggregate
net exposure in the underlying futures market and in the most liquid contracts. For instance, it is
common to hedge long-term exposure by rolling over short-term contracts (e.g., Metallgesellschaft).
A similar argument can be made for the net commodity option imbalance held by banks in the
aggregate. Therefore, producersaggregate net hedging pressure is likely to be reected in trades
in the underlying short-term futures market.
4.2 The Time-Series Behavior of Producer Hedging
Information about hedging positions from accounting statements could potentially be used directly
to assess the impact of time-varying producer hedging demand on commodity returns. However,
there are signicant data limitations for such use. First, FAS 133 requires the rms to report mark-
to-market values of derivative positions, which are not directly informative about underlying price
exposure. There is no agreed upon reporting standard or requirement for providing information
on e¤ective price exposure for each rms derivative positions, which leads to either non-reporting,
or very di¤erent reporting of such information. For instance, rms sometimes report notional
outstanding or number of barrels underlying a contract, but not the direction of the position or the
actual derivative instruments and contracts used, the 5%-, 10%-, or 20%-delta with respect to the
underlying, or Value-at-Risk measures (again sometimes without mention of direction of hedge).
We went through all the quarterly and annual reports available for the rms with SIC codes 2910
and 2911 (50 rms) in the EDGAR database to attempt to extract (a) whether the rms were long
or short the underlying, and (b) the extent of exposure in each quarter or year as measured by
sensitivity to price changes in the underlying commodity futures price (i.e., a measure of Delta).
Panel D in Table 1 reports that of the 34 rms with these SIC codes that we could nd in
EDGAR, only 19 (56%) gave information about the direction of the hedge (long or short the
underlying). Of these, 80%, on average, of the rm-date observations were short the underlying
commodity. Since commodity producers are naturally long the commodity, one would expect that
the producers derivative hedge positions are always short the underlying. However, there are
complicating factors. First, some rms do take speculative positions. Second, there are cases where
hedging demand could manifest itself in long positions in the futures market. For instance, a pure
rener may have an incentive to go long crude oil futures to hedge its input costs, but short,
say gasoline futures to hedge its production. This suggests that it might be fruitful to separate
producers and producer reners (such as Marathon Oil) from pure reners (such as Frontier Oil)
in the analysis, and we do so as a robustness check.
Of the 19 rms that reported whether they were long or short in the futures markets, we could
only extract a reliable, and relatively long, time-series of derivative position exposure to the under-
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lying commodity price for 4 rms: Marathon Oil, Hess Corporation, Valero Energy Corporation,
and Frontier Oil Corporation. Consequently, the data is not rich enough to provide a measure
of aggregate producer hedging positions based on direct (self-reported) observations of producers
futures hedging demand, even for the relatively short period for which EDGAR data is available.
Nevertheless, we show the relationship between the time series of hedging behavior and default
risk for the 4 rms for which we were able to extract this information. This represents an interest-
ing insight into the time-series variation in hedging, which complements existing analyses (such as
Haushalter (2000, 2001)) of the cross-sectional relation between hedging behavior and default risk
measures.
4.3 Observed Hedging Demand and Default Risk
From the quarterly and annual reports of these four rms, we extract a measure of each rms
$1 delta exposure to the price of crude oil (i.e., how does the value of the companys derivative
position change if the price of the underlying increases by $1). This measure of each rms hedging
position is constructed from, for instance, value-at-risk numbers that are provided in the reports
by assuming log-normal price movements and using the historical mean and volatility from the
respective commodity futures returns. In other cases, rms report deltas based on 5%, 10% and
20% moves in the underlying price, which are then used to construct the $1 delta number as a
measure of hedging demand.
We next compare the time-series of each of the rmscommodity derivatives hedging demand
to each rms Zmijewski-score and 3-year lagged stock return throughout the EDGAR sample.
There are too few observations per rm to compare with the naive-EDF scores, which is only
provided to us until the end of 2003. Figure 3a shows the negative of the imputed delta and the
Zmijewski-score for each of the four companies. Both variables are normalized to have mean zero
and unit variance. The gure shows that there is a strong, positive correlation between the level
of default risk, as measured by the Zmijewski-score and the amount of short exposure to crude oil
using derivative positions for Marathon Oil, Hess Corp., and Valero Energy Corp. For Frontier Oil
Corp., the hedging activity is strongly negatively correlated with the Zmijewski-score. The same
pattern can be seen in Figure 3b, where each rms hedging activity is plotted against the negative
of its 3-year average stock returns. Marathon Oil and Hess both extract and rene oil and so it is
natural that as default risk and hedging demand increases, these rms increase their short crude
oil positions. Valero, however, is a pure rening company that one might argue should go more
long crude oil as default risk increases. This does not happen, however, because Valero in fact
holds inventory of its input, crude oil, as well as for rened products. This was inferred by reading
Valeros quarterly reports, and is anecdotally quite a common happenstance for reners. Thus, an
increase in the demand for hedging leads to increasing hedge of both the input and output good
inventories. Frontier Oil, however, behaves more as one might naively expect of a rener, as the
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company does not hold signicant crude inventory in this sample, and decreases its short crude
positions as default risk increases. Finally, as a check that the proxies used capture default risk in
our sample, Figure 3c shows the time-series relation between Valeros 5-year CDS spread (obtained
from Markit) and its short crude oil hedging. Valero is the only of these rms where CDS data was
available to us. Again, we see a strong relation between hedging and default risk.
In sum, in these four rms, which constituted the best sample available in EDGAR of the
producer rms, it is clear that hedging activity is time-varying, and related to the proposed proxies
for fundamental hedging demand. However, the graphs highlight that one must take care when
inferring expected hedging activity from whether a rm is involved only with extraction, extraction
and rening, or purely rening. Essentially, all rms are to some extent naturally long crude oil,
but for pure reners, this is likely less true than for companies that engage in both extraction as
well as rening - echoing the analysis in Ederington and Lee (2002).
We now turn to our analysis of the aggregate relationships between our proxies for fundamental
hedging demand, spot returns and futures risk premia in the oil and gas markets. We will, however,
use the non-hedging rms identied in the micro-analysis in this section and the separation between
producers and reners to perform robustness checks for our aggregate results to come.
5 Aggregate Empirical Analysis
In this section, we employ the aggregate measures of producer hedging demand, for which we
reported summary statistics in the Data section, to test the empirical predictions of the model
documented in Section 2.
5.1 Commodity Futures and Spot Prices
Our commodity futures price data is for NYMEX contracts and is obtained from Datastream. The
longest futures return sample period available in Datastream goes from the rst quarter of 1980
until the fourth quarter of 2006 (108 quarters; crude oil).
To create the basis and returns measures, we follow the methodology of Gorton, Hayashi and
Rouwenhorst (2007). We construct rolling commodity futures excess returns at the end of each
month as the one-period price di¤erence in the nearest to maturity contract that would not expire
during the next month. That is, the excess return from the end of month t to the next is calculated
as:
Ft+1;T   Ft;T
Ft;T
; (17)
where Ft;T is the futures price at the end of month t on the nearest contract whose expiration date
T is after the end of month t+ 1, and Ft+1;T is the price of the same contract at the end of month
t+1. The quarterly return is constructed as the product of the three monthly gross returns in the
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quarter.
The futures basis is calculated for each commodity as (F1=F2   1), where F1 is the nearest
futures contract and F2 is the next nearest futures contract. Summary statistics about these
quarterly measures are presented in Table 2. Note that the means and medians of the basis in the
table are computed using the raw data, while the standard deviation and rst-order autocorrelation
coe¢ cient are computed using the deseasonalized basis, where the deseasonalized basis is simply
the residual from a regression of the actual basis on four quarterly dummies. The basis is persistent
across all commodities once seasonality has been accounted for.
Table 2 further shows that the excess returns are on average positive for all three commodities,
ranging from 2:5% to 6:7%, with relatively large standard deviations (overall in excess of 20%). As
expected, the sample autocorrelations of excess returns on the futures are close to zero. The spot
returns are dened using the nearest-to-expiration futures contract, again consistent with Gorton,
Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007):
Ft+1;t+2   Ft;t+1
Ft;t+1
: (18)
Again, the quarterly return is constructed by aggregating monthly returns as dened above. Note
that the spot returns display negative autocorrelation, consistent with mean-reversion in the level
of the spot price.
5.2 Inventory
For all four energy commodities, aggregate U.S. inventories are obtained from the Department
of Energys Monthly Energy Review. For Crude Oil, we use the item: U.S. crude oil ending
stocks non-SPR, thousands of barrels. For Heating Oil, we use the item: U.S. total distillate
stocks. For Gasoline, we use: U.S. total motor gasoline ending stocks, thousands of barrels.
Finally, for Natural Gas, we use: U.S. total natural gas in underground storage (working gas),
millions of cubic feet.Following Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007), we compute a measure
of the discretionary level of aggregate inventory by subtracting a moving trend of inventory from
the quarterly realized inventory (so as to avoid look-ahead bias). Quarterly trend inventory is
created using a Hodrick-Prescott lter with the recommended smoothing parameter (1600). In all
specications that employ inventories, we also include quarterly dummy variables, to control for
the strong seasonality present in inventories. Table 2 shows summary statistics of the resulting
aggregate inventory measure, i.e., the cyclical component of inventory stocks, for the commodities.
Once the seasonality in inventories is accounted for, the trend deviations in inventory are persistent.
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5.3 Hedger Positions Data.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) reports aggregate data on net hedger
positions in a variety of commodity futures contracts. These data have been used in several papers
that arrive at di¤ering conclusions about their usefulness. For example, Gorton, Hayashi and
Rouwenhorst (2007) nd that this measure of hedger demand does not signicantly forecast forward
risk premiums, while De Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) nd that they hold some forecasting power
for futures risk premia. The CFTC hedging classication has signicant shortcomings; in particular,
anyone that can reasonably argue that they have a cash position in the underlying can obtain a
hedger classication. This includes consumers of the commodity, and more prominently, banks
that have o¤setting positions in the commodity (perhaps on account of holding a position in the
swap market). The line between a hedge trade and a speculative trade, as dened by this measure,
is therefore blurred. We note these issues with the measure as they may help explain why the
forecasting power of hedging pressure for futures risk premia is debatable, while our measures of
default risk do seem to explain futures risk premia. Nevertheless, we use the CFTC data as a check
that our measures of producershedging demand is in fact reected in futures positions as noted
by the CFTC.
The Hedger Net Positions data are obtained from Pinnacle Inc., which sources data directly from
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Classication into Hedgers, Speculators and
Small traders is done by the CFTC, and the reported data are the total open positions, both short
and long, of each of these trader types across all maturities of futures contracts. We measure the
net position of all hedgers in each period as:
HedgersNetPositiont =
(HedgersShortPositiont  HedgersLongPositiont)
(HedgersShortPositiont 1 +HedgersLongPositiont 1)
: (19)
This normalization means that the net positions are measured relative to the aggregate open interest
of hedgers in the previous quarter. Summary statistics on these data are shown in Table 2. First,
the hedger positions are on average positive, which means investors classied as hedgers are
on average short the commodity forwards. However, the standard deviations are relatively large,
indicating that there are times when the CFTC classied hedgersare actually net long commodity
futures contracts.
5.4 Aggregate Controls
In our empirical tests, we use controls to account for sources of risk premia that are not due to
hedging pressure. In a standard asset pricing setting, time-varying aggregate risk aversion and/or
aggregate risk can give rise to time-variation in excess returns. This is reected in the pricing
kernel, , of equity-holders in the model. To capture this source of variation, therefore, we include
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business cycle variables that have been shown to forecast excess asset returns in previous research.
We include the Default Spread: the di¤erence between the Baa and Aaa rated corporate bond
yields, which proxies for aggregate default risk in the economy and has been shown to forecast
excess returns on stocks and bonds (see, e.g., Fama and French (1989), and Jagannathan and Wang
(1996)). Following Harrison and Yogo (2009), we also include the Term Spread, constructed as the
di¤erence between the yield on a 5-year zero-coupon T-bond and the yield on the 3-month T-bill. We
do not include the aggregate dividend yield, as this variable has no forecasting power for commodity
returns (results available on request). Finally, to account for time-varying expected commodity spot
demand, we use a forecast of quarterly GDP growth, obtained from the Philadelphia Feds survey
of professional forecasters.
5.5 Commodity Specic Controls
We also include controls that are specic to each commodity. As emphasized in Gorton, Hayashi,
and Rouwenhorst (2008), the cyclical level of inventory is related to the conditional volatility of the
commodity price, and as such, the volatility of spot and futures returns. The basis is related to (the
probability) of an inventory stock-out, and so is expected to have predictive power mainly for the
spot return. When there is ample inventory, however, the basis is not expected to be informative
about spot or futures returns, and so it should not drive out predictability that arises from producer
hedging demand. The lagged futures return is included to capture autocorrelation in excess futures
returns not captured by the other controls. A component of the measures of producer default risk
will be related to lagged commodity returns (as rm performance is related to commodity returns),
and we want to ensure that the proxies for producer hedging demand are not simply capturing this
autocorrelation in commodity returns. Finally, we include quarterly dummy variables in all the
regressions as both the independent and many of the dependent variables in the regressions exhibit
seasonalities.
5.6 Empirical Results
Before we test the predictions of the model with respect to the expected commodity futures and spot
return, we rst perform an additional check of the validity of the aggregate measures of producers
fundamental hedging demand by relating them to the CFTC measures of aggregate net hedging
demand. As previously explained, the aggregate CFTC data on hedger positions is noisy. However,
a noisy measure of hedger positions should still contain information about the underlying true
producer hedging demand.
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5.6.1 CFTC Hedging Positions and Producer Hedging Demand
We construct the hedger net position variables from the CFTC data as the net short position, so
we should expect a positive relation between the default risk and CFTC hedger positions. Table 3
reports the results of the regression:
HedgerNetPosi;t = iDefRiski;t + ControlV ariablest + ui;t; (20)
where i denotes the relevant commodity (crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, or natural gas). The
term "ControlVariables" is a catch-all term for the inclusion of the control variables described
earlier, and DefRiskdenotes the average producer Zmijewski-score, the average producer Naive
EDF, or the negative of the 3-year average producer stock returns (so as to make the expected
regression coe¢ cient, i, positive in all specications). In these regressions, both the left- and
right-hand side variables are normalized to have unit variance, so the regression coe¢ cients can be
easily interpreted. Table 3 shows that 10 out of 12 of the regression coe¢ cients (0s) are positive
and that half are positive and signicant at the 10% level or greater at the individual commodity
level. The signicance level is overall increasing in the number of observations available (Natural
Gas and Gasoline have the fewest observations and largely insignicant coe¢ cients). To alleviate
issues regarding power, we present in the right-most column of Table 3 the -coe¢ cients from
pooled regressions across all commodities for all the default risk measures. In all three cases, the
regression coe¢ cient is positive and signicant at the 5% level.15 Thus, the aggregate measures
of producer hedging demand are indeed signicantly and positively related to the CFTC recorded
aggregate "hedger" positions.
5.6.2 Commodity Futures Returns
Next, we evaluate the rst part of Proposition 1, namely that increases in fundamental hedging
demand are associated with higher futures risk premia. To do so, we run a standard forecasting
regression for excess commodity futures return, using our default risk proxy for fundamental hedging
demand. In particular, we regress quarterly (excess) futures returns on one quarter lagged measures
of default risk and control variables:
ExcessReturnsi;t+1 = iDefRiski;t + ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1; (21)
where i denotes the commodity and t denotes time measured in quarters.
Table 4 shows the results of the above regression across the four commodities considered, as
15Note that in all individual-commodity regressions in this paper, standard errors are constructed using the Newey-
West (1987) method, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms, and in all pooled
regressions, we employ Rogers (1983, 1993) errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, own and cross-autocorrelation
and contemporaneous correlation across all commodities in each quarter.
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well as a pooled regression across all commodities. First, we note that in all cases, the regression
coe¢ cients have the predicted sign: an increase in default risk forecasts higher futures returns over
the next quarter. For ease of interpretation, the default risk measures are in all cases normalized
to have unit variance, and thus the regression coe¢ cients give the expected futures return response
to a one standard deviation change in the aggregate default risk measure. The average expected
return response is highly economically signicant at 4% per quarter across the commodities. The
standard deviation of quarterly futures returns of Crude Oil, Heating Oil, and Gasoline is 20%
per quarter, and so the implied quarterly R2 from the e¤ect of the producer fundamental hedging
demand alone is 4% for these commodities. This is high for a quarterly forecasting regression,
considering the high persistence of the predictive default risk variables.16
The pooled regressions show that the e¤ect of producer hedging demand is signicant at the 5%
level or greater for all the default measures. In the individual regressions, the evidence is strongest
for Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline, and somewhat weaker for Natural Gas. However, the the
latter has the shortest time-series (49 and 63 quarters when using the naive EDF or the two other
default risk measures, respectively), which potentially explains the lower signicance. Furthermore,
Haushalter (2000, 2001) points out that hedging for Natural Gas producers in particular is less
prevalent and more risky since there is substantial basis risk depending on the location of the
producer relative to the location at which the benchmark price is set.17 This may also be responsible
for the somewhat weaker results we see for this commodity throughout the paper.
In sum, we conclude that there is strong evidence that commodity producers fundamental
hedging demand is positively related to the expected return of commodity futures, consistent with
the model in Section 2. Next, we report three robustness checks of our results.
Volatility Interaction. From the expression for the futures risk premium in Equation (11),
the model implies an interaction between fundamental hedging demand (p) and the commodity
futures return volatility. In particular, a change in fundamental hedging demand has a larger impact
on the futures risk premium if volatility is high. We test this relation by running the regression:
ExcessReturnsi;t+1 = i;1RVi;t+i;2DefRiski;t+i;3RVi;tDefRiski;t+ControlV ariablest+ui;t+1;
(22)
where i denotes the commodity, t denotes time measured in quarters, and RVi;t is a measure of the
conditional variance at time t of futures returns from time t to t+ 1 for commodity i (the realized
variance). The model predicts a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term (i;3). Since volatility
16The default risk measures are also signicant predictors of futures returns in simple univariate regressions (not
reported).
17He mentions, for example, that in 1993 the correlation between the prices of natural gas sold at Wheeling Ridge
Hub in California and gas sold at Henry Hub in Louisiana (the benchmark for prices on NYMEX contracts) was
slightly less than 30%
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also appears in the covariance term in Equation (11), it is important to include its direct e¤ect.
Further, the conditional volatility of futures returns is an indirect control for supply uncertainty
(probability of inventory stock-out or other production shocks) that may be correlated with default
risk. The estimate of the conditional variance we use is the realized average squared daily futures
returns from time t to t+1. The use of the realized variance as the volatility measure is convenient
as there are both seasonalities and trends in volatility over the sample. Table 5 shows the results
of the above regression, where all the independent variables are normalized to have zero mean
and unit variance. Focusing on the pooled regression results in the rightmost column, we see that
including the volatility interaction term increases the average response (2) from its level in Table
4, from 4% to about 6%. The e¤ect is signicant for all the default risk measures and the signs are
as predicted by the model.
Producers versus reners. Next, we consider the forecasting power of the default risk
measures based on all rms in our sample, as before, versus the subset of rms that state they are
solely reners. To separate these two groups, we peruse the accounting statements from EDGAR
to nd rms that are solely reners. As discussed in Section 3, pure play reners may hedge short
crude oil if they store crude, but if they do not they have an incentive to hedge by going long as
they use crude oil as an input good. Thus, aggregate default risk measures based only on pure play
renersdata should forecast futures returns with a negative sign (per the results for Frontier Oil
discussed in Section 3), when combined with the default risk measures that we have been using
that are derived from all rms in the sample. In particular, we run the regression:
ExcessCrudet+1 = 1DefRisk_Allt+2DefRisk_Refinerst+ControlV ariablest+ut+1; (23)
where DefRisk_All are the aggregate default risk measures used before, and DefRisk_Refiners
are the default risk measures constructed using only rms that are identied as pure play ren-
ers. The independent variable (ExcessCrude) is the one-period-ahead return on crude oil futures.
Table 6 shows that all the default risk measures based on pure play reners come in negative, as
conjectured, and signicant for the Zmijewski-score and lagged negative 3-year stock returns. The
Table also shows the corresponding forecasting regression for changes in the spot price, which yield
similar results.
Hedgers versus Non-Hedgers. Next, we consider the forecasting power of default risk mea-
sures based on producers that state they are hedgers, and contrast these measures with measures
derived from producers that are stated non-hedgers. First, we use the CFTC measures to substan-
tiate a split of the sample of producing rms into rms that state they hedge, versus rms that
are self-stated non-hedgers. This split is then used as a robustness check for the futures return
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forecasting regressions. The goal is to substantiate that our results arise from fundamental hedging
demand rather than from any omitted variable in our empirical model that simultaneously drives
defaults and the commodity futures risk premium.
We split the producers into two groups based on whether a producer is a stated hedger or
non-hedger, according to the data we gathered in Section 3 on individual rmsdisclosures about
their hedging policies. If our model is correct, the forecasting power of default risk for futures
risk premia should arise only for those rms that engage in hedging. To implement the split, we
must implicitly extrapolate the behavior of the sample rms backwards in time. This is because
the EDGAR data only contains information back to 1998. Panel A of Table II identies 20 rms
as stated non-hedgers and 146 rms as stated hedgers. We construct aggregate Zmijewski-scores,
Naive EDFs, and 3-year average returns based on these two sets of rms.
One concern that arises in this context is that hedging rms tend to be quite a bit larger than
the non-hedgers. In particular, the average market value of the hedgers is $3,035 million versus
only $313 million for stated non-hedgers. Furthermore, the sample of hedging rms is larger,
which reduces the idiosyncratic noise in aggregate measures constructed for this group of rms. To
facilitate comparisons that are not driven by these di¤erences, we identify a matched sample of self-
described hedging producer rms, by removing the rms with the largest market values until the
average market value of the small hedgers is about the same as for the non-hedgers ($373 million);
the standard deviation of the market values is also then comparable to that of the non-hedgers.
There are 59 rms in this matched sample, and we run our tests also using this matched sample.
To decrease the amount of noise in the proxy for fundamental hedging demand in these tests, we
here dene a consolidated default risk variable as simply an equal weighted average of the Zmijewski-
score, the naive EDF and the negative of the 3-year lagged stock return, where each of these variables
have been normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. The resulting consolidated, aggregate
default risk measures is also normalized to have unit variance so the regression coe¢ cients are
easy to interpret and compare to the previous results.18 Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of
regressions pooled across commodities, with aggregate default risk measures based on hedger- as
well as non-hedger rms on the right-hand-side:
HedgerNetPost = 1 (DefRisk_Hedgerst +DefRisk_NonHedgerst) :::
+ 2DefRisk_NonHedgerst + ControlV ariablest + ut: (24)
A signicant 2 < 0 in these regressions would indicate that the regression coe¢ cient on the default
risk measure of non-hedging producers is signicantly smaller than the regression coe¢ cient on the
18Since we only have data on the naive EDF until 2003Q3, the nal observations up until 2006Q4 are based on the
Zmijewski-score and the 3-year stock returns only. The aggregate measure is normalized to have unit variance rst
in the period up to 2003Q2 and then also in the period after 2003Q2, so as to avoid building in a structural break in
the volatility of the series.
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default risk measure of hedging producers. Panel A of Table 7 shows that in all the regressions
the sign of 1 is strongly positive, while the sign of 2 is negative (and in most cases signicant).
Inspecting the magnitude of the regression coe¢ cients, the implied regression coe¢ cient on the
non-hedgersdefault risk measure (1+2) is, as expected, close to zero. Thus, it is the default risk
of those producers that hedge exposure, not default risk in general, that drives aggregate hedging
pressure as dened by the CFTC.
Panel B of Table 7 considers the futures return forecasting regressions using the same cross-
sectional split of the sample of rms. Again the regressions are pooled across commodities and
using only the consolidated default risk measure described above:
ExcessReturnst+1 = 1 (DefRisk_Hedgerst +DefRisk_NonHedgerst) :::
+ 2DefRisk_NonHedgerst + ControlV ariablest + ut+1: (25)
The table conrms that the di¤erence in the forecasting power is statistically signicant. The
1-coe¢ cients are positive and signicant at the 1% level or greater, while the 2-coe¢ cients are
negative and signicant at the 5% level or greater. Yet again, the implied coe¢ cient on non-hedger
default risk is close to zero in these specications, which indicates that it is the default risk of rms
that actually do hedge that matters for the futures risk premium, rather than default risk per se.19
5.7 Commodity Spot Returns
The model predicts a strong common component in spot and futures returns arising from the
producersfundamental hedging demand. Table 8 shows forecasting regressions of quarterly spot
returns on the baseline lagged default risk measures, analogous to the regressions in Table 4 for the
case of the futures returns. In particular, the regression is:
SpotReturnsi;t+1 = iDefRiski;t + ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1; (26)
where the control variables are the same as before. The spot return is as dened in Section 3, the
change in the price of the nearest to maturity contract relative to its previous value. Table 8 shows
that there is a clear positive relation between default risk and spot returns on commodities. In
particular, all the default risk measures are signicant at the 5% level or better in the pooled re-
gressions. The regression coe¢ cients are very close to those found in the futures returns forecasting
regressions, as predicted by the model the common component in the expected futures and spot
19This result also shows that our matching approach provides a useful alternative to the classication schemes
normally employed in the literature, namely, the CFTC reported classication of futures market participants into
hedgers and speculators (see De Roon et. al.(2000)). Our approach also o¤ers an alternative to identication schemes
based purely on the reported functions of commodity rms such as producer, rener, marketer or distributor (see
Ederington and Lee (2002) for evidence that such classications are noisy measures of rmsactual hedging activities).
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returns are of a similar size. Unlike in the results for futures returns, however, the basis is highly
signicant in the pooled regressions. This is also consistent with the model, which predicts that
the basis will indeed be more informative about future spot prices than futures risk premia.
Link between futures risk premium and the spot price. In the model, a decrease in
the futures risk premium leads to an increase in the spot price as producers are willing to hold
more inventory when the cost of hedging is lower. The spot regressions are consistent with this
result, as ceterus paribus, an increase in the spot price leads to a lower expected spot return. To
the extent that the massive increase in speculator demand for long commodity futures positions
over the recent years led to a decrease in the futures risk premium, we should expect to have seen
an increase in the spot price. This e¤ect is due to the possibility for increased risk-sharing between
producers and speculators on account of the lower futures risk premium. Note that an increase in
spot prices can occur through this channel even if there are no other changes in the fundamentals
(production and demand) of the commodity spot market.
5.8 Speculator Activity
Following Etula (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2009), we use the growth in intermediaries(aggregate
Broker-Dealer) assets relative to household asset growth as a measure of speculatorsease of access
to capital in aggregate ( 1s ). This data is constructed from the U.S. Flow of Funds data. Etula
(2009) shows that high relative growth in Broker-Dealer asset predicts low subsequent commodity
futures returns, consistent with a relaxation of capital constraints leading to a lower commodity
futures risk premium. The Broker-Dealer data is available quarterly for the full sample period. In
addition to this aggregate measure, we use the growth in Commodity Trading Advisors(CTAs)
aggregate assets-under-management (AUM) relative to aggregate household asset growth as a com-
modity specic measure of arbitrage capital. The CTA data is from a consolidated dataset, drawn
from HFR, TASS and CISDM databases, and is available from 1994 until the end of the sample.20
Table 9 shows the results of forecasting regressions of the futures return, the spot return, and
annual inventory (the inventory is annual to nullify the e¤ect of seasonalities). In addition to the
default risk measures used previously (the Zmijewski-score, the naive EDF and the 3-year stock
return), we add either the Broker-Dealer or the CTA measure of arbitrage activity as an independent
variable. The control variables used are the same as elsewhere in the paper. The table shows that
the predictions of the model, listed in Proposition 1; are borne out in the data: expected spot
and futures returns are (1) decreasing in speculator risk appetite, as proxied by speculator relative
asset growth, (2) increasing in producer hedging demand, and (3) the signs are the opposite when
20The panel of dollar AUM data is winsorized at the 0.25 and 99.75 percentile points and then aggregated across
all funds in specic self-declared strategies each quarter. These strategies are CPO-Multi Strategy, CTA - Com-
modities, CTA-Systematic/Trend-Following, Managed Futuresand Sector Energy.
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inventory holdings are the dependent variable. All the signs are as predicted and only 3 out of 36
regression coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant. The regression also shows that real quantities
(in this case inventory) are a¤ected by limits to arbitrage and hedging demand, as predicted by the
model.
The interaction of speculator activity and producer hedging demand. In the dis-
cussion of Figure 1, which shows the predictions of the calibrated model, we noted that the model
predicts an intuitive interaction between the severity of the speculator constraint and producers
fundamental hedging demand. In particular, if speculators have ample capital, they are willing to
cheaply take the opposite side of producershedge-motivated futures demand, while if speculator
capital is scarce, the compensation required (the futures risk premium) is large.
To empirically evaluate this interaction, we check whether the component of the Crude Oil
futures risk premium that is due to hedging pressure is negatively correlated with speculator relative
asset growth. The proxy for the fundamental hedging demand used here is the consolidated default
risk measure, based on a weighted average of the three default risk measures. The proportion of
the risk premium due to producer hedging demand is constructed using the same regressions as
in Table 4 and Equation (21). In particular, the estimated risk premium due to producer hedging
demand (^DefRiskDefRiskt) is divided by the total estimated risk premium (^AllAllControlst +
^DefRiskDefRiskt), at each point in time. This measure is then squared to create a conditional
R2, and we take the log of this measure to reduce its skewness. While the regressions are quarterly,
we sum to an annual, overlapping quarterly series to avoid seasonalities and to better capture
the underlying lower frequency dynamics. The asset growth measures are also summed to an
annual, overlapping quarterly series. To avoid any systematic component in either of the series,
the measures of arbitrageur asset growth and default risk are orthogonalized with respect to the
controls.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of the speculator activity and producer hedging component of
the risk premium over the sample period. Both variables are normalized to have zero mean and
unit variance for ease of comparison. The sample correlation and signicance level is also shown
in the Figure. For the full sample using the Broker-Dealer measure (the top plot) the correlation
is -0:17 and signicant at the 5% level. That is, the proportion of the commodity futures risk
premium that is due to producer hedging demand tends to be low when arbitrage capital is high
and high when arbitrage capital is low, as predicted by the model. The middle plot on Figure 4
shows that this relation is stronger in the last 12 years of the sample. Here the correlation is -0:42
and signicant at the 1% level. For the CTA data, which goes from 1994 to 2006, the full sample
relation is insignicant, although slightly positive, while the relation is strongly negative (-0:36)
and signicant at the 5% level from 2000 until the end of the sample, when the ows of speculator
capital to the commodity markets were particularly large and volatile.
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In sum, the evidence presented here indicates that time-varying market segmentation, due to
time-variation in the severity of limits to arbitrage for speculators in the commodity market, impacts
futures and spot commodity prices and inventories, through the hedging demand of producing rms.
In particular, there is an intuitive, lower frequency interaction between speculator capital and the
impact of producer hedging demand and market prices that is uncovered when we consider annual
measures of hedging demand and speculator capital supply.
5.8.1 Other Robustness Tests
When splitting the sample, all the pooled regression coe¢ cients indicate a positive relation between
producer fundamental hedging demand and the futures risk premium in the rst half of the sample.
However, this e¤ect is only statistically signicant for the 3 year lagged return measure. The
predictability evidence is stronger in the second half of the sample. Here all the pooled regressions
are signicant at the 1% level or better. The magnitude of the regression coe¢ cients are, however,
comparable across the samples. We also considered the following additional controls: Surprise
OPEC production to control for international supply shocks, and aggregate Zmijewski-score of
airlines - the latter as a measure of hedging demand of rms that are consumers of the commodity.
None of these controls a¤ect the economic or statistical signicance of the reported results.21
6 Conclusion
We build a theoretical model in which the interaction between commodity producers who are
averse to price uctuations, and capital constrained speculators that invest in commodity markets
determines commodity spot prices and commodity futures risk premia in equilibrium. Using a
theoretically and empirically motivated proxy for the fundamental hedging demand of commodity
producers - their default risk - and data from oil and gas markets, we nd evidence to support the
predictions of the model. Our main insight is that the hedging demand of producers is an important
channel through which trading in commodity futures markets can a¤ect spot prices. This occurs in
our model because futures markets allow producersinventory holdings to better adjust to current
and future demand shocks.
Our model and results provide a useful lens through which to view an important debate about
recent gyrations in commodity prices. Between 2003 and June 2008, energy, base metals, and pre-
cious metals experienced price rises in excess of 100%. Over the same period, there was a huge
increase in the amount of capital committed to long positions in commodity futures contracts.22
21These results are not reported, but they are available upon request.
22 In July 2008, pension funds and other large institutions were reportedly holding over $250 billion in commodity
futures (mostly invested through indices such as the S&P GSCI) compared to their $10 billion holding in 2000
(Financial Times, July 8 2008)
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While these trends occurred concurrently, some market practitioners and economists vehemently
argued that the speculative investments of nancial players in the futures market have no direct
relationship with commodity spot prices. Other commentators (most notably, Michael Masters, a
hedge-fund manager, and George Soros, who both testied to the US Congress) have blamed spec-
ulative activity for recent commodity price rises. A third group (one that includes former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan) has taken an intermediate view that commodity spot prices
are fundamentally driven by physical demand, but that nancial speculation has played some role
in recent price rises. This last set of commentators has also argued that nancial speculation is in
fact stabilizing, for some of the reasons we outline in the model: the long positions taken by nan-
cial investors have enabled producers to take short hedging positions and hold larger inventories,
which increases current spot prices and should stabilize prices going forward.
In support of this last view, we agree with the chain of reasoning specied for the rise in spot
prices. This is also consistent with the fallout of the sub-prime crisis in 2008, which increased
speculator risk-aversion and simultaneously raised producer default risk. This increased producer
hedging demand at the same time that it became costlier to hedge, causing inventories to eventually
fall and lowering spot prices. We acknowledge that our theory, which is based on risk-sharing
between producers and speculators, is unlikely to explain the full magnitude of the rise and fall in
oil prices witnessed recently. Rather than a complete explanation, we view the mechanism we have
outlined as a likely contributing factor to recent price movements.
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 Table 1 
Producer Hedging – Summary Statistics 
 
The data in this table is taken from 10-Q and 10-K filings in the Edgar database of firms with SIC codes 1310, 1311 
(mainly Natural Gas), and 2910 and 2911 (mainly Crude Oil and Refined Products). The Edgar files have only been 
obtained for firms that are verified to be crude oil or natural gas producers, oil refiners, and oil refined product 
marketers.  
 
Panel A:    
 Number Proportion  
Firms in CompuStat sample (SIC 1310, 1311, 2910, 2911) 570   
Firms where Edgar filings could be found 231   
- # firms where cannot tell if use commodity derivatives 
- # firms that do not use commodity derivatives 
39 
20 
17% 
9% 
 
- # firms that use commodity derivatives 172 74%  
 
Panel B: 
   
    
Hedging vs. Speculation Number Proportion  
Firms that hedge 146 85%  
Firms that both speculate and hedge 16 9%  
Firms that do not specify 10 6%  
 172 100%  
Panel C: 
 
 
Instruments Number Proportion  
Futures 47 20%  
Forwards 21 9%  
Options 48 20%  
Swaps* 124 52%  
Strategies** 80 33%  
Not Specified 9 4%  
    
* Mainly of two types: Price Swaps and Spread Swaps    
** Usually Collars, sometimes Put Spreads, Call Spreads 
 
Panel D:      
Commodity Class 
and Direction (SIC 
2910, 2911) 
Firms in Edgar 
where direction of 
hedge is known 
Proportion of 
all Edgar 
firms 
# of time- 
series obs. 
# of obs. where  
firm is short 
Proportion of 
all time-series 
observations 
Crude Oil* 7 88% 113 98 87% 
Natural Gas* 3 50% 42 32 76% 
Crude Oil + Natural 
Gas** 2 100% 2 2 100% 
Refined Products*** 4 44% 50 41 82% 
Various**** 3 33% 20 8 40% 
All Commodity 
classes 19 56% 227 181 80% 
      
* Including positions reported as dominated by, but not exclusively comprising, this class 
** Where reported as a combined class 
*** Includes Gasoline, Diesel, Heating Oil, Jet Fuel and Asphalt 
**** Where firms report all or some of the above classes together, sometimes combined with other classes such 
as electricity 
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 Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and the first autocorrelation coefficient AR(1)) of the 
variables AVGZm (cross-sectional average quarterly Zmijewski-score); AVG3Y (cross-sectional average of the time-
series average stock return per producer-firm over the past three years, each quarter); cross-sectional average naïve EDF 
(expected default frequency) from Bharath and Shumway (2008); basis (standard deviation and AR(1) computed for the 
deseasonalized series); spot returns; futures excess returns; net change in hedger’s short positions and the change in 
aggregate inventory (standard deviation and AR(1) computed for the deseasonalized series), all measured quarterly as 
specified in the Data section.  These statistics are computed for each of Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline and Natural 
Gas.    
 
  Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas 
     
AVGZm     
Mean -2.689 -2.727 -2.692 -2.587 
StdDev 0.318 0.323 0.329 0.417 
AR(1) 0.951 0.939 0.969 0.702 
 
AVG3Y     
Mean 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.004 
StdDev 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.013 
AR(1) 0.930 0.930 0.953 0.923 
 
Naïve EDF     
Mean 0.037 0.040 0.036 0.099 
StdDev 0.030 0.032 0.029 0.073 
AR(1) 0.726 0.743 0.719 0.829 
 
Basis     
Mean 0.018 0.026 0.040 -0.039 
StdDev 0.059 0.131 0.081 0.136 
AR(1) 0.462 0.146 0.390 0.342 
 
Spot Return  
Mean 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.042 
StdDev 0.170 0.179 0.175 0.226 
AR(1) -0.132 -0.143 -0.137 -0.194 
 
Futures Excess Return     
Mean 0.043 0.044 0.067 0.025 
StdDev 0.206 0.200 0.210 0.298 
AR(1) -0.123 -0.078 -0.183 0.035 
 
Hedgers Net Position     
Mean 0.003 0.080 0.069 0.067 
StdDev 0.072 0.114 0.099 0.068 
AR(1) 0.135 -0.010 0.256 0.206 
 
Change in Inventory     
Mean -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.004 
StdDev 0.044 0.088 0.035 0.156 
AR(1) 0.551 0.506 0.138 0.415 
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Table 3: CFTC Hedging Position vs Default Risk (Fundamental Hedging Demand)
The independent variables are CFTC aggregate net short hedger positions in Crude Oil, Heating Oil, 
Gasoline, and Natural Gas. The measures of fundamental hedging demand are the average 
Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of the average returns 
the last 3 years (-avg3yr) for the sample of producers in each commodity. These dependent variables, 
as well as the independent variables, are normalized to have unit variance. The data is quarterly and 
contemporaneous. The controls are defined in the main text, and their regression coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) 
are given in parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Crude Heating Natural Pooled
Oil Oil Gasoline Gas regression
avgZm 0.188** 0.273*** -0.094 0.130 0.140**
(0.096) (0.075) (0.078) (0.085) (0.062)
R2 21.4% 44.8% 38.6% 66.6% 18.3%
# obs 80 92 80 53 305
avgEDF 0.312** 0.146* 0.173* 0.055 0.147**
(0.136) (0.086) (0.097) (0.068) (0.072)
R2 26.1% 48.0% 34.9% 71.4% 20.2%
# obs 69 81 69 42 261
-avg3yr 0.101 0.204*** -0.045 0.016 0.090**
(0.098) (0.059) (0.075) (0.061) (0.045)
R2 19.6% 42.2% 38.0% 65.8% 17.4%
# obs 80 92 80 53 305
Controls? yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 4: Forecasting Commodity Futures Returns
The independent variables are excess returns of futures on Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and Natural Gas. The measures of 
fundamental hedging demand are the average Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of the 
average returns the last 3 years (-avg3yr) for the sample of producers in each commodity. These dependent variables are normalized to 
have unit variance. The data is quarterly and the dependent variables are lagged one quarter relative to the independent variables. The 
controls are defined in the main text of the paper, and their regression coefficients are reported here with the exception of the regression 
coefficients for the quarterly dummy variables. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) are 
given in parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Hedging Demand Measures Commodity Specific Variables Standard return predictors          
Futures ΔGDP Term Risk-free Default
avgZm avgEDF -avg3yr Basis Inventory Return (-1) forecast Spread rate Spread N R2
Panel A: Crude Oil
0.064*** -0.159 0.621 -0.067 0.036** -5.352*** -1.252 0.049 90 17.3%
(0.022) (0.652) (0.453) (0.078) (0.014) (1.796) (0.950) (0.065)
0.041** 0.092 1.026 -0.113 0.023 -4.544** -0.485 0.035 76 17.9%
(0.020) (0.657) (0.648) (0.091) (0.017) (2.272) (1.291) (0.075)
0.061*** 0.124 1.043** -0.090 0.033** -4.967*** -2.131** 0.072 90 16.8%
(0.021) (0.609) (0.497) (0.084) (0.015) (1.839) (0.916) (0.067)
Panel B: Heating Oil
0.047** 0.015 -0.149 -0.106 0.015* -2.793** -0.107 -0.006 107 12.1%
(0.019) (0.183) (0.181) (0.071) (0.009) (1.341) (0.777) (0.044)
0.040*** 0.073 -0.095 -0.116 0.011 -2.179* 0.150 0.059 93 11.0%
(0.013) (0.177) (0.189) (0.078) (0.008) (1.275) (0.750) (0.045)
0.046*** 0.046 -0.037 -0.103 0.015 -2.884** -0.513 -0.013 107 12.2%
(0.016) (0.157) (0.178) (0.072) (0.010) (1.431) (0.792) (0.046)
Panel C: Gasoline  
0.042** 0.907*** 0.238 -0.278*** 0.050*** -4.793*** -0.924 0.112** 83 30.3%
(0.020) (0.151) (0.545) (0.057) (0.012) (1.432) (1.150) (0.058)
0.066*** 0.785*** -0.176 -0.294*** 0.028*** -0.747 2.006 0.068 69 35.8%
(0.016) (0.146) (0.447) (0.056) (0.010) (2.088) (1.603) (0.058)
0.045** 0.897*** 0.317 -0.284*** 0.048*** -4.633*** -1.325 0.134** 83 31.0%
(0.020) (0.140) (0.524) (0.057) (0.012) (1.632) (1.127) (0.060)
Panel D: Natural Gas
0.067 0.450 0.030 -0.094 0.057 -0.768 -0.579 0.135 63 11.6%
(0.046) (0.326) (0.243) (0.160) (0.041) (5.412) (2.732) (0.155)
0.016 0.194 0.234 -0.050 0.093* -7.829 -2.817 0.240 49 13.6%
(0.039) (0.407) (0.325) (0.198) (0.058) (7.235) (3.596) (0.204)
0.108** 0.330 0.271 -0.059 0.070* -6.613 -3.077 0.067 63 17.2%
(0.045) (0.340) (0.292) (0.158) (0.041) (5.433) (2.808) (0.140)
Panel E: Pooled Regression
0.038** 0.117 0.117 0.038 0.029** -3.632*** -0.951 0.024 343 11.4%
(0.016) (0.106) (0.106) (0.070) (0.011) (1.327) (0.727) (0.042)
0.036*** 0.199** 0.032 -0.109* 0.022** -3.157** -0.573 -0.009 287 9.8%
(0.009) (0.098) (0.104) (0.065) (0.010) (1.608) (0.914) (0.049)
0.040** 0.114 0.114 0.067 0.029** -4.186*** -1.515** 0.036 343 12.8%
(0.016) (0.099) (0.099) (0.072) (0.011) (1.420) (0.765) (0.046)
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Table 5: Interaction of Conditional Variance and Fundamental Hedging Demand
The independent variables are the quarterly futures return for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and 
Natural Gas.  The measures of fundamental hedging demand are the average Zmijewski-score 
(avgZm), the average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of the average returns the last 3 years    
(-avg3yr) for the sample of producers in each commodity. The measures of the  conditional variance 
of each futures' returns is the realized variance (based on daily data). The dependent variables are 
normalized to have unit variance. The data is quarterly and the dependent variables are lagged one 
quarter relative to the independent variables. The controls are described in the main text in the paper. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) are given in 
parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Crude Heating Natural Pooled
Oil Oil Gasoline Gas regression
Realized Variance (RV) -0.007 0.017 0.042 0.123** 0.025
(0.040) (0.036) (0.032) (0.053) (0.030)
avgZm 0.072*** 0.048** 0.053*** 0.126** 0.057***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.054) (0.019)
Z *RV 0 070** 0 012 0 006 0 158*** 0 041*avg m . . - . . .
(0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.038) (0.022)
R2 19.8% 12.7% 33.1% 28.1% 13.3%
# obs 90 107 83 52 332
Realized Variance (RV) 0 039 0 043 0 029 0 102** 0 054***  . . . . .
(0.041) (0.030) (0.026) (0.046) (0.015)
naiveEDF 0.058** 0.045** 0.065*** 0.184*** 0.068***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.023) (0.054) (0.012)
naiveEDF*RV 0.117** 0.044 -0.047 0.132*** 0.066**
(0.050) (0.032) (0.033) (0.046) (0.028)
R2 24.7% 13.1% 40.4% 50.5% 17.2%
# obs 76 93 69 38 276
Realized Variance (RV) -0.049 0.009 0.044* 0.029 0.005
(0.036) (0.031) (0.029) (0.052) (0.019)
-avg3yr 0.077*** 0.046*** 0.064*** 0.082* 0.052***
(0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.044) (0.014)
-avg3yr*RV 0.093** 0.009 -0.059* 0.082*** 0.034***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.031) (0.020) (0.010)
R2 21.0% 12.4% 34.9% 25.1% 13.1%
# obs 90 107 83 52 332
Controls? yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 6: All firms versus Refiners: Spot and Futures forecasting regressions
The independent variables are the quarterly futures return and percentage spot price change for 
Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and Natural Gas.  The measures of fundamental hedging demand 
are the average Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of 
the average returns the last 3 years (-avg3yr) for the sample of producers in each commodity. In 
addition to these measures based on all firms (All firms), we include these measures based on pure 
play refiners only (Refiners). The dependent variables are normalized to have unit variance. The 
data is quarterly and the dependent variables are lagged one quarter relative to the independent 
variables. The controls are described in the main text in the paper. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) are given in parentheses; *** means p-
value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Futures: Crude Oil Spot: CrudeOil
Zm-score Naïve EDF -avg3yr Zm-score Naïve EDF -avg3yr
All firms 0.107*** 0.055* 0.153*** 0.090*** 0.055* 0.136***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.049) (0.024) (0.032) (0.049)
Refiners -0.051*** -0.006 -0.105* -0.043** -0.015 -0.093*
(0.018) (0.024) (0.054) (0.017) (0.024) (0.052)
R2 18.8% 19.0% 19.1% 25.6% 27.2% 26.5%
# obs 90 76 90 91 77 91
Controls? yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 7 : Hedgers versus Non-Hedgers - pooled regressions
The independent variables are the net short hedger positions as reported by the CFTC (Panel A) 
and excess returns of futures on Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and Natural Gas (Panel B). 
The regressions are pooled across the commodity classes. Further, the measure of fundamental 
hedging demand is, as explained in the main text, an average of the three measures used (average 
Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of the average 
returns the last 3 years (-avg3yr)) for the sample of producers in each commodity. These 
dependent variables are calculated for both hedgers and non-hedgers. The hedger measure is 
calculated using all stated hedgers (regressions denoted (1)), as well as using a matched sample 
of small hedgers (regressions denoted (2)). The controls are explained in the main text. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) are given in 
parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
  b1 (Hedger + b2
Non-Hedger) (Non-Hedger) Controls? R
2
# obs
Panel A: Contemporaneous CTFC net short hedger positions as dependent variable
(1) Hedger measure constructed 0.210*** -0.217** yes 20.3% 305
using all hedgers (0.050) (0.105)
(2) Hedger measure constructed 0.175*** -0.124 yes 19.4% 305
using small hedgers (0.045) (0.114)
Panel B: Next quarter futures return as dependent variable
(1) Hedger measure constructed 0.055*** -0.057** yes 13.0% 343
using all hedgers (0.016) (0.026)
(2) Hedger measure constructed 0.054*** -0.045** yes 12.2% 343
using small hedgers (0.015) (0.019)
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Table 8: Forecasting Commodity Spot Price Changes
The independent variables are the changes in the spot prices relative to previous quarters price on Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and 
Natural Gas. The measures of fundamental hedging demand are the average Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the average Naive EDF 
(avgEDF), and the negative of the average returns the last 3 years (-avg3yr) for the sample of producers in each commodity. These 
dependent variables are normalized to have unit variance. The data is quarterly and the dependent variables are lagged one quarter 
relative to the independent variables. The controls are defined in the main text of the paper, and their regression coefficients are 
reported here with the exception of the regression coefficients for the quarterly dummy variables. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (using 3 lags) are given in parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Hedging Demand Measures Commodity Specific Variables Standard return predictors          
Futures ΔGDP Term Risk-free Default
avgZm avgEDF -avg3yr Basis Inventory Return (-1) forecast Spread rate Spread N R2
Panel A: Crude Oil
0.054** -0.783 0.876* -0.068 0.032** -5.461*** -1.364 0.047 91 24.6%
(0.022) (0.603) (0.455) (0.056) (0.013) (1.701) (0.933) (0.059)
0.033* -0.564 1.292** -0.106* 0.021 -4.919** -0.597 0.045 77 26.1%
(0.017) (0.597) (0.624) (0.067) (0.016) (2.200) (1.183) (0.069)
0.054*** -0.568 1.237** -0.087 0.031** -5.211*** -2.123** 0.069 91 24.6%
(0.021) (0.560) (0.507) (0.059) (0.014) (1.792) (0.842) (0.060)
Panel B: Heating Oil
0.035* -0.255*** 0.121 -0.140*** 0.019** -3.503*** -0.557 -0.008 108 21.8%
(0.020) (0.088) (0.174) (0.050) (0.009) (1.235) (0.779) (0.041)
0.033*** -0.196*** 0.222 -0.148*** 0.014* -2.901*** -0.022 -0.054* 93 24.4%
(0.012) (0.076) (0.168) (0.055) (0.007) (1.065) (0.740) (0.038)
0.029* -0.230*** 0.189 -0.134*** 0.018** -3.354*** -0.798 -0.016 108 21.2%
(0.015) (0.076) (0.176) (0.052) (0.009) (1.186) (0.757) (0.040)
Panel C: Gasoline  
0.029* 0.036 0.837* -0.225*** 0.033*** -3.553** -1.423* 0.004 88 26.7%
(0.017) (0.168) (0.443) (0.060) (0.012 (1.487) (0.836) (0.069)
0.059*** -0.096 0.588 -0.241*** 0.011 -0.557 1.124 -0.040 74 27.3%
(0.017) (0.194) (0.399) (0.065) (0.014) (1.482) (1.184) (0.076)
0.023 0.041 0.865* -0.222*** 0.029** -3.169* -1.613** 0.013 88 26.0%
(0.017) (0.163) (0.449) (0.060) (0.013) (1.632) (0.780) (0.069)
Panel D: Natural Gas
0.057 -0.078 0.120 -0.195* 0.062 -1.431 -0.332 0.117 64 17.2%
(0.039) (0.248) (0.223) (0.115) (0.040) (5.113) (2.274) (0.117)
0.010 -0.276 0.245 -0.196 0.090* -7.001 -0.952 0.258 50 20.6%
(0.038) (0.299) (0.279) (0.154) (0.055) (6.584) (2.452) (0.166)
0.089** -0.140 0.305 -0.174 0.072* -6.014 -2.099 0.083 64 21.4%
(0.041) (0.246) (0.244) (0.122) (0.041) (4.900) (2.080) (0.112)
Panel E: Pooled Regression
0.037** -0.328*** 0.034 -0.150*** 0.026** -3.319*** -0.948 0.010 351 15.2%
(0.016) (0.065) (0.082) (0.029) (0.010) (1.064) (0.777) (0.044)
0.033*** -0.358*** 0.034 -0.145*** 0.018** -2.820** -0.318 -0.017 294 16.7%
(0.011) (0.041) (0.100) (0.023) (0.009) (1.190) (0.840) (0.046)
0.037** -0.320*** 0.067 -0.149*** 0.025** -3.558*** -1.308* 0.017 351 15.3%
(0.016) (0.050) (0.085) (0.026) (0.010) (1.308) (0.763) (0.045)
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Table 9: Hedging Demand and Speculator Risk Tolerance 
The independent variables are aggregate inventory above trend value, futures return, and net spot price change 
for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline, and Natural Gas.  The regressions are pooled across the four 
commodities. The measures of fundamental hedging demand are the average Zmijewski-score (avgZm), the 
average Naive EDF (avgEDF), and the negative of the average returns the last 3 years (-avg3yr) for the sample 
of producers in each commodity. The measures of speculator risk tolerance are growth in aggregate Broker-
Dealer assets (BD measure) and growth in Commodity Trading Advisor's assets under management (CTA  _            
measure); both minus the aggregate growth in household assets. The dependent variables are normalized to 
have unit variance. The data is quarterly and the dependent variables are lagged one quarter relative to the 
independent variables., except for inventory which is annual and where the lag is one year. The controls are 
described in the main text in the paper. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
(using 3 lags) are given in parentheses; *** means p-value < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
B-D measure CTA measure
Pooled Futures Spot Annual Futures Spot Annual
forecasting regs: return %-change Inventory return %-change Inventory
Spec measure -0.059*** -0.062*** 0.015*** -0.072*** -0.053*** 0.023***_
(0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
avgZm 0.034* 0.022 -0.023** 0.069*** 0.033** -0.033*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018)
R2 17.1% 22.0% 75.8% 19.1% 11.4% 79.0%
# obs 343 351 331 200 200 188
Spec_measure -0.058*** -0.061*** 0.014*** -0.061*** -0.035** 0.015*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009)
avgEDF 0.025** 0.022*** -0.034*** 0.038*** 0.029*** -0.058***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017)
R2 15.6% 22.6% 76.9% 22.8% 18.1% 81.0%
# obs 287 294 287 144 144 144
Spec_measure -0.063*** -0.065*** 0.019** -0.070*** -0.052*** 0.019***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004)
-avg3yr 0.051*** 0.032** -0.008 0.070*** 0.031* -0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013)
R2 19 5% 23 0% 75 1% 20 1% 11 3% 78 0%. . . . . .
# obs 343 351 331 200 200 188
Controls? yes yes yes yes yes yes
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 Figure 1 – Model Predictions 
 
All plots have producer fundamental hedging demand (p{2,4,...,20}) on the horizontal axis. The 
dashed line corresponds to high speculator capital constraints (s=40), while the solid line is the case 
of low speculator capital constraints ((s=8)). The two top plots show the cost of hedging as a 
proportion of firm value (left) and the quarterly Sharpe ratio of the abnormal returns earned by 
speculators. The two middle plots show (on the left) the component of the futures risk premium due 
to the covariance with the equity market pricing kernel and (on the right) the component due to the 
combination of hedging pressure and limits to arbitrage. The two lowest graphs show the expected 
spot price change relative to the current spot price and the optimal inventory. The numbers used in 
the calibration of the model are given and explained in main text.  
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 Figure 2a – Aggregate Default Risk Measures (I) 
 
This figure plots the default risk measures (AVG3Y, AVGZm and Naïve EDF) for Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline 
(the series used for all three commodities are the same, since the producer firms are in the same SIC classification 
codes).  The series are normalized by subtracting their means and dividing by their standard deviations for ease of 
plotting. 
 
 
Figure 2b – Aggregate Default Risk Measures (II) 
 
This figure plots the default risk measures (AVG3Y, AVGZm and Naïve EDF) for Natural Gas producers.  The series 
are normalized by subtracting their means and dividing by their standard deviations for ease of plotting. 
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 Figure 3a – Firm Crude Oil Hedging and the Zmijewski-score 
 
The plots show short hedging, measured as the negative of the Delta of their current crude oil 
derivatives positions, for the four firms in the sample where a minimal time series of observations 
are available, relative to each firm’s Zmijewski-score. Each series, for each firm, is normalized to 
have zero mean and unit variance to facilitate easy comparison. 
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 Figure 3b – Firm Crude Oil Hedging and the Negative of the 3 Year Average Stock Return 
 
The plots show short hedging, measured as the negative of the Delta of their current crude oil 
derivatives positions, for the four firms in the sample where a minimal time series of observations 
are available, relative to the negative of each firm’s 3 year lagged returns. Each series, for each firm, 
is normalized to have zero mean and unit variance to facilitate easy comparison. 
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 Figure 3c – Valero Hedging and CDS spread 
 
The plot shows short hedging, measured as the negative of the Delta of Valero’s current crude oil 
derivatives positions versus its current 5 year credit default swap spread. Both series are normalized 
to have zero mean and unit variance to facilitate easy comparison. 
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Appendix
A. Calibration
We calibrate the model using the volatility of the commodity futures returns, commodity expenditure relative to aggregate
endowment (GDP) and aggregate endowment growth, as well as the mean and volatility of the equity market pricing kernel.
All moments are quarterly, corresponding to the empirical exercise in the next section. We calibrate the demand shock A1
to roughly correspond with aggregate GDP growth and set  = 0:004,  = 0:02 and the initial demand shock A0 = 1. We
set the depreciation rate, , to 0:01. Further, we assume the log stochastic discount factor () has a quarterly volatility of
20% and a mean of -0:25%, corresponding roughly to an annual equity Sharpe ratio of 0:4 and a risk-free rate of 1%. We let
the stochastic discount factor be perfectly negatively correlated with the demand shocks. Next, we calibrate the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution " and the constant ! jointly such that the standard deviation of futures returns (S1   F ) =F is about
20% per quarter, as in the data, and the average commodity expenditure is about 10% of expenditures on other goods. Given
the volatility of demand shocks, this is achieved when " = 0:1 and ! = 0:01. That is, consumers are relatively inelastic in
terms of substituting the commodity good for other goods, which is reasonable given our focus on oil and gas in the empirical
section.23 We let period 0 and period 1 production, g0 and g1, be 0:8 and 0:75; respectively, such that inventory holdings are
positive.
The severity of the models frictions are increasing in the variance aversion of producers and speculators, p and s. As we
posit mean-variance preferences, the values of these coe¢ cients do not directly correspond to easily-interpretable magnitudes
(such as might be the case with relative risk aversion). We therefore use the following two economic measures to calibrate a
reasonable range for each of these parameters. First, we let the loss to the rm from hedging, hE [ (S1   F )] ; be between
0:1% and 1% of rm value and, second, we let the abnormal quarterly Sharpe ratio earned by speculators be between 0:05 and
0:25. The variation in these quantities is shown in the two top graphs of Figure 1, where p 2 f2; 4; :::; 20g on the horizontal
axis and s 2 f8; 40g is shown as a dashed line for high speculator risk aversion and a solid line for low speculator risk aversion.
B. Proofs of results given in the main body of paper
It is useful to establish some preliminary results. Note that for the futures market to clear when p, s > 0, the condition
E [ (S1   F )] > 0 must be satised (see Equation (9)). Since this implies that hp < I (1  ) + g1 (see Equation (4)), we have
from Equation (3) that E [S1]  S0= (1  ) > 0 when there is no stock-out ( = 0).
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The consumer demand function is given by
St = !

At
Qt
1="
= !Q
 1="
t e
1
"
at : (27)
where the log of the demand shock At (at) is distributed N
 
; 2

and where Qt is the equilibrium commodity supply at time
t. Since Qt is predetermined, the variance of the period 1 spot price conditional on period 0 information is:
2S = Q
 2="
1 k; (28)
where k  !2

e(=")
2   1

e2="+(=")
2
.
23This also justies our implicit model assumption that price risk outweighs quantity risk for the producers. As
pointed out by, e.g., Hirshleifer (1988), if the opposite is the case, producers would hedge by going long the futures
contract.
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First, consider the case of no stock-out,  = 0. In this case, we have from the equilibrium condition given in Equation (10)
that:
Q
2="
1 (E [S1 (I
)]  S0 (I) = (1  )) = ps
p + s
kQ1: (29)
Taking the total derivative of Equation (29) with respect to producer default risk, we have:
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In this calculation, we are assuming that the pricing kernel  is not a¤ected by changes in inventory. Given the inverse demand
function, dS1
dI
< 0 and dS0
dI
> 0, and therefore E
h
 dS1
dI
i
  dS0
dI
= (1  ) < 0. Also, as noted in the preliminary results above,
E [S1]  S0= (1  ) > 0: Since St = !Q 1="t e
1
"
at , and since Q0 = G0   I and Q1 = G1 + (1  ) I, we have that:
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Focusing on the sign of the two last terms in the denominator on the left hand side of Equation (31), and substituting in the
expressions from Equations (34) and (35), we have that:
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We still cannot sign this term. However, we can use the following relations to get us the nal step. Since (1  )E [S1] S0 > 0,
2
using the inverse demand function, it follows that
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Using this inequality to sign Equation (36), we have that:
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Thus, referring now back to Equation (31), dI
dp
< 0. In the case of an inventory stock-out, we have trivially that dI
dp
= dI
ds
= 0.
The derivative of the expected spot return with respect to producer risk aversion is then:
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Thus, the expected percentage spot price change is increasing in the producersrisk aversion, p, as stated in the proposition.
If there is a stock-out, there is no change in the expected spot return, since in this case dI
dp
= 0.
Next, we turn to the futures risk premium. Consider the impact on the futures risk premium of a change in inventory in
the case of no stock-out, when F = S0 1+r1  (using Equations (??) and (6)):
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since E
h
@S1
@I
i
< 0, and @S0
@I
> 0: Since dI
dp
< 0, the futures risk premium is increasing in producer risk aversion (p) if there
is no stock-out:
d
E(S1) F
F
dp
> 0.
Next, consider the case of a stock-out. Now, the spot price in period 0 and expected spot price in period 1 stay constant.
In this case, the futures price can be written: F = S0 1+r1     1+r1  . The futures risk premium is then:
E [S1]  F
F
=
E [S1]  S0 1+r1  +  1+r1 
S0
1+r
1     1+r1 
: (45)
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From Equation (10), we have that:
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First consider the derivative of  with respect to p:
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Since in a stock-out dI
dp
= 0, we have that
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Given this, the derivative of the futures risk premium with respect to producersrisk aversion in the case of a stock-out is:
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since d
dp
> 0.
By the symmetry of the equilibrium condition (Equation (29)) it is clear that all the above statements regarding producer
risk aversion hold also for speculator risk aversion. That is, dI
ds
< 0,
d
E(S1) F
F
ds
> 0, d
ds
E[S1] S0
S0
> 0. Thus, equilibrium
inventory holding is decreasing in producer and speculator risk aversion, while expected spot and futures returns are increasing.
C. Endogenizing the Pricing Kernel
The model presented here generalizes the model in the main text of the paper. In particular, we endogenize the pricing
kernel and the commodity demand function by specifying consumers preferences over the consumption of commodity and
"other" goods.
C.1. Consumers.
Let consumerspreferences be given by:
V = u (C0; Q0) + E0 [u (C1; Q1)] ; (50)
where Ct is the consumption of other goods (the numeraire goods), while Qt the endogenous equilibrium commodity supply.
The felicity function is of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
u(x; y) =
1
1  

x(" 1)=" + !y(" 1)="
"=(" 1)1 
; (51)
where " is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and  is the level of relative risk aversion. From the intratemporal FOC,
4
we have that the equilibrium commodity spot price St is given by:
St = !

Ct
Qt
1="
: (52)
The consumers own a Lucas tree producing the numeraire good At, as well as the commodity producing rms. The consumers
must, however, hire managers to manage the rms (their inventory and hedging decisions). Consumers can also invest in the
commodity futures markets, through intermediaries which we term speculators. These speculators act as arbitrageurs between
the commodity futures market and the equity market. The equity market consists of the commodity producing rms and the
claim to the Lucas tree producing the other goods (At). Investing in the commodity futures is costly to the consumers as the
speculators require compensation for their skill. Therefore, the consumersequilibrium consumption of other goods will equal
Ct = At   The Cost of Investing in Commodity Funds.
C.2. Producers.
The managers, as in the model in the main text, act competitively and maximize rm value subject to a variance penalty.
The latter is reduced form for contracting frictions that leaves the manager with excess exposure to the uncertainty of period
1 rm earnings. Thus, the managers objective function and rst order conditions are as given in Equations (2), (3), and (4).
We do not model the managersconsumption choices, but instead argue that this is a reasonable abstraction as there are very
few managers relative to the total population (The total number of rms in our sample is 531). Even if these individuals are
wealthier than average, their consumption is a minuscule component of aggregate consumption.
C.3. Speculators.
Commodity fund managers, as in the model in the main text, act competitively and maximize their earnings (the abnormal
payo¤ E [ (S1   F )]) subject to a penalty for the variance of their payo¤s. The latter is reduced form for agency concerns
that limit the capital ows to these funds. In equilibrium, the payo¤ to the consumer from owning the commodity producing
rm and from holding a share in a commodity futures fund must be the same. Therefore, for the consumer the NPV of a
marginal investment in a commodity futures through a fund must in equilibrium be zero: E [ (S1   F )]  cost = 0. Therefore,
the aggregate fund manager compensation is hsE [ (S1   F )]. Given the optimal position in futures contracts from Equation
(8), we have that the equilibrium aggregate cost is E[(S1 F )]
s2s
2
. Note that the total gain of arbitrageurs in the futures market
equals the total loss incurred by the producers. The reason the consumers are willing to incur this cost is the utility gain from
moving to more optimal Q0 and Q1 as the futures price a¤ects the commodity producersinventory decisions.
The cost is incurred at time zero. Thus, time 0 consumption is A0   E[(S1 F )]2s
2
, while time 1 consumption is C1 = A1.
In equilibrium, E [ (S1   F )] = pss+p 
2
sQ1, so
E[(S1 F )]
s2s
2
= 1
s

ps
s+p
2
2sQ
2
1. The risk-free rate is set by r = 1=E [] 1
as before. Further substituting out 2s , we have that
Aggregate cost =
1
s

ps
s + p
2
!2Q
2(1 1=")
1 k; (53)
where k is a positive constant dened earlier. Thus, both the supply of the commodity and consumption of other goods are
a¤ ected by the combination of hedging demand and limits to arbitrage :
C0 = A0   1
s

ps
s + p
2
!2Q
2(1 1=")
1 k: (54)
It is clear then that the marginal rate of substitution for consumers is explicitly a function of both inventory and the risk
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aversions/costs:
 (I ; p) = 
0B@ A1
A0   1s

ps
s+p
2
!2Q
2(1 1=")
1 k
1CA
 
0BBBBBBB@
1 + !

Q1
A1
(" 1)="
1 + !
0@ Q0
A0  1s

ps
s+p
2
!2Q
2(1 1=")
1 k
1A(" 1)="
1CCCCCCCA
(1= ")=((" 1)=)
;
(55)
where we have substituted in the expressions for consumption of other goods, C0 = A0   1s

ps
s+p
2
!2Q
2(1 1=")
1 k and
C1 = A1.
This analysis shows that the frictions assumed in this paper (limits to arbitrage and producer hedging demand) in general
equilibrium also a¤ect the consumption of other goods and the equity market pricing kernel. Thus, the covariance term in
Equation (11) is a¤ected, not only through the volatility of the commodity price as in the partial equilibrium model in the
main text, but also through the dynamics of the pricing kernel (). However, the identifying component of the frictions lies in
the risk compensation of the second term in Equation (11), which is related to the magnitude of desired hedging and the total
volatility (including any idiosyncratic components) of the futures price.
Since changes in producer and speculator variance aversion coe¢ cients a¤ect the pricing kernel, and thus the risk-free
rate (r = 1=E []   1), we cannot in general sign the e¤ect of a change in these parameters on inventory and the futures
risk premium. In particular, in calibrated versions of the model, we for some parameter congurations obtain that inventory
decreases in response to an increase in producer fundamental hedging demand. However, the implications for the futures risk
premium remained robust in these calibrations (results not reported, but available upon request).
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